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I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1947 the American military government imposed a new
constitution1 upon the defeated Japanese nation. 2 Stressing indi* For valuable comments and suggestions during the preparation of this article, I am
grateful to Professors Chalmers Johnson, John W. Poulos, Rudolf P. Schlesinger and Roger
W. Traynor. For her patience, support, and help, I thank Mary Kay Bennett Bolx. For
capably typing the manuscript, I thank Cynthia Bufkin and Myrl Northway. I also
appreciate Kevin Ward's skillful editorial assistance. The author remains, nonetheless,
responsible for errors.
In the text, following the traditional East Asian practice, given names of Japanese
nationals are placed after family names. In footnotes, for the sake of uniformity, Western
usage is followed, with given names (as necessary) placed before family names.
1. The Constitution of Japan, Nihonkoku kemp5 in Japanese, is also referred to as the
Constitution of 1947 (versus the old Constitution of 1889), as the MacArthur Constitution,
and as the Peace Constitution. This current Constitution is also termed the Showa Constitution after the reign name of the current emperor, whereas the 1889 Constitution-promulgated in the reign of the Meiji Emperor-is often termed the Meiji Constitution. The 1889 document may also be referred to as the Imperial Constitution.
English texts of both Constitutions may be found in H. BORTON, JAPAN'S MODERN CENTURY 490 (1955) and H. TANAKA, THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM: INTRODUCTORY CASES AND
MATERIALS 3 (1976) [hereinafter cited as TANAKA]. The official English translation of the
1947 Constitution published by the Japanese Ministry of Justice is also available in THE
CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN AND CRIMINAL STATUTES 3 (1958); THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN: ITS
FIRST TwENTY YEARS, 1947-1967 at 301 (D. Henderson ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN]; J. MAKI, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN JAPAN: SELECTED SUPREME DECI-

SIONS, 1948-60 at 411 (1964) [hereinafter cited as MAKI]; H. ITOH and L. BEER, TaE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF JAPAN: SELECTED SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, 1961-1970 at 256 (1978)

[hereinafter cited as ITOH & BEER]. Provisions of the 1947 Constitution shall be set forth in
this article exactly as translated in this official English version.
2. Drafted by Americans under the supervision of General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, the Constitution was promulgated by the Emperor on November 3, 1946, and became effective on May 3, 1947. The document was
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vidual rights and the rule of law, the new constitution departed
radically from the collectivist, authoritarian pattern of prewar Japan. Among other innovations, Article 813 of the new constitution
explicitly granted a Supreme Court4 the power of judicial review. 5
This postwar high court, following its establishment in 1947, was
initially cautious in its use of judicial review.
The Japanese Supreme Court has helped to preserve the postwar constitution and its own power by this cautious use of judicial
review, notably by avoiding the issue of the constitutionality of Japan's military, the so-called Self-Defense Forces. Anxious to help
stabilize the new postwar regime, the judges who staffed the Court
in its early years showed great deference to the judgments of Japan's parliament, the Diet. As the years passed, it became clear
that the new government was stable-perhaps overly stable. As the
"new men" of the postwar era came to dominate the Court, and as
the social order developed in more "democratic" directions, the
Court has become more willing to invalidate legislation.
Since 1973, the Court has taken a more active role. Statutes
have been declared unconstitutional on five occasions, in 1953,7

promulgated after minimal consultation with Japanese officials. See J. STOCKWIN, JAPAN:
DIVIDED POLITICS IN A GRowTH ECONOMY 173-77 (1975); Maki, The JapaneseConstitutional
Style, in CONSTrrUTION OF JAPAN, supra note 1, at 9.
3. Article 81 is set forth in text preceding.
4. The name of this court in Japanese is Saik5 Saibansho. The prewar court of last
resort, the Daishinin or Taishinin, is variously translated as the Court of Cassation (after
the French Cour de Cassation), the Great Court of Cassation, and the Great Court of
Judicature.
5. Following the definition of Henry Abraham, "judicial review" is "[tihe power of any
court to hold unconstitutional and hence unenforceable any law, any official action based
upon a law, and any other action by a public official that it deems ... to be in conflict with
the Basic Law." T. BECKER, COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL POLITICS: THE POLITICAL FUNCTIONING OF
COURTS 204 (1970).
6. According to one view, the first two cases indicated here may not have involved
"statutes." See note 218 infra.
7. Sakagami v. Japan, 7 Keishii 1562 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Oct. 5, 1953), cited in Haley,
Comments and Case Notes, 8 LAw INJAPAN 188 (1975), reprinted in JUDGMENT UPON CASE
OF VALIDITY OF CABINET ORDER No. 325 of 1950 (General Affairs Bureau, General Secretariat, Supreme Court ed.); PROMINENT JUDGMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT UPON QUESTIONS
OF CONSTITUTIONALITY (No. 1, 1954) [hereinafter cited as PROMINENT JUDGMENTS]. See notes
47 and 48, and note 218 infra.
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1962,8 1973, 9 19750 and 1976.11
From its earliest days, the Court has been roundly criticized in
some quarters for its "remarkable reluctance" to exercise judicial
review. This school of thought is rooted in fundamental misconceptions of Japanese law and society. Such superficial analysis not
only overlooks the powerful forces that initially militated against
the vigorous exercise of judicial review, but also discourages investigation into the complex causes of the Court's eventual assumption of a more active role. If one concludes that the Japanese
Court-inexplicably disregarding the clear mandate of the Constitution 12-was remarkably reluctant in the early (pre-1973) years to
engage in judicial review, there is the danger of assuming that the
justices have now simply resolved to carry out their sworn duties.
The "remarkable reluctance" school of thought stems primarily from two distorted perceptions of Japanese law and society.
On the one hand, some Western observers have betrayed ethnocentric bias and have tended to overlook the Japanese environment by
evaluating the Court's actions in terms of American judicial standards. On the other hand, many Japanese commentators, caught
up in the passionate rearmament debate in Japan, have evaluated
the Court's actions from a committed pacifist viewpoint.
The ethnocentric perspective is well-illustrated by a frank
comment of General Douglas MacArthur, the postwar military governor of Japan, who oversaw the drafting of the Constitution of
1947. The Japanese, MacArthur stated in 1951, "measured by the
standards of modern civilization. . . would be like a boy of 12 as
compared to our development of 45 years. Like any tuitionary period, they were susceptible to following new models, new ideas.
8. Nakamura v. Japan, 16 Keish-u 1593 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Nov. 28, 1962), cited in Haley,
supra note 7, at 188, reprinted in ITOH & BEER,supra note 1, at 58. See text accompanying
notes 49-56 infra.

9. Aizawa v. Japan, 27 Keishil 256 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Apr. 14, 1973), cited in Haley, supra
note 7, at 188, reprinted in PROMNErr JUDGMENTS, supra note 7 (1973); excerpted in
TANAKA, supra note 1, at 725-28. See text accompanying notes 219-26 infra.

10. K.K. Sumiyoshi v. Governor of Hiroshima Prefecture, 665 Saibansho Jiho 1, 592
Juristo 60 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Apr. 30, 1975), cited in Haley, supra note 7, at 189, reprintedin 8
LAW IN JAPAN 194 (1975). See text accompanying notes 227-29 infra.
11. Kurokawa v. Chiba Prefecture Election Commission, 30 Minsh 223 (Sup. Ct., G.B.,
Apr. 14, 1976), cited in Recent Developments, 9 LAW IN JAPAN 151 (1976), reprinted in
PROMINENT JUDGMENTS (1976), supra note 7. See text accompanying notes 58 & 230-35
infra.
12. Article 81 of the Japanese Constitution, set forth in text preceding note 34 infra.
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You can implant basic concepts there. They were still close enough
to origin to be elastic and acceptable to new concepts." 13
In 1960, an American professor evaluated how well the Japanese pupils had followed this new idea of judicial review. This
scholar noted that the revolutionary American-written Constitution of 1947 had elevated the Japanese Supreme Court to a new
position of authority similar to that of the American judiciary.
Armed with the power of judicial review, and for the first time in
its history enjoying an independent status, the Court was indeed
in a position to become "keeper of the Constitution". However,
the results in the first decade leave much to be desired, at least
when considered by Western standards. For the most part the
Japanese judiciary has approached its newly conferred powers
with timidity, with only an occasional lower court ruling or dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court
justice to indicate that a
14
revolution has indeed taken place.
In 1972, a Japanese observer, reaching a similar conclusion for
different reasons, characterized the Court's conduct as "abstention
from judicial review," rather than merely "self-restraint." 15 This
observer expressed the fear that if the Court continued to be "subservient" to the Cabinet concerning Article 9, there would be "no
constitutional safeguard against the further escalation of our Defense Forces," even including tactical nuclear weapons and
conscription. 6
Also reflecting the continuing debate on the rearmament issue,
a Japanese legal scholar noted: "the people hope that the judges
will use the independence of their offices and their consciences to
protect the constitution and human rights" by declaring unconstitutional the maintenance of military power by Japan.17 A sympathetic American commentator demanded in 1975 that rather than
13. Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign
Relations to Conduct an Inquiry into the Military Situation in the FarEast and the Facts
Surroundingthe Relief of Generalof the Army Douglas MacArthur from his Assignments
in that Area, part I, 82nd Cong. 1st Sess. 312, quoted in S. JOHNSON, AmRICAN ATTUDES
TOWARD JAPAN 1941-1975, at 51 (1975).
14. Dionisopoulos, JudicialReview and Civil Rights in Japan, 12 W. POLITICAL Q. 269
(1960).
15. Okudaira, The Japanese Supreme Court: Its Organization and Function, 3 LAW
AsIA 67, 91 (1972).

16. Id. at 105. Article 9 is set forth in text accompanying note 59 infra.
17. Wada, Decisions Under Article 9 of the Constitution-the Sunakawa, Eniwa and
Naganuma Decisions, 9 LAW iN JAPAN 117, 128 (1976).
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continuing to avoid the issue of the Japanese military's constitu-

tionality, the Japanese Supreme Court "must interpret Article 9,
the supreme law of the land, if it is to give life and meaning to the

Japanese Constitution." 18
An Australian commentator, relying heavily on one of the Japanese observers just quoted, described the Japanese Supreme
Court in 1975 as "remarkably reluctant to exercise with any vigor
the power of judicial review conferred by Article 81 of the

Constitution."19
This article presents a contrasting interpretation of the Japanese Court's actions, an interpretation that will focus on 1) the significant impediments to the development in Japan of the powerful
American style of judicial review and 2) the important influences
that have nonetheless, since 1973, gradually resulted in a more active use of judicial review. The thesis of this article is that the Japanese Supreme Court's restrained use of the power of judicial review has been a rational strategy designed to preserve or to
increase the Court's political power; that viewing the Court in social and political perspective reveals that this restraint has not
' 20
been "remarkable.
18. Slomanson, Judicial Review of War Renunication in Naganuma Nike case: Juggling the Constitutional Crisis in Japan, 9 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 24, 25 (1975) (emphasis
added).
19. STOCKWIN, supra note 2, at 183 (emphasis added). Stockwin does not, however, omit
the other side of the story, noting elsewhere (at 187) that given the conservative hue of
postwar cabinets, it is "perhaps scarcely surprising" that judges appointed by such cabinets
would be cautious in exercising judicial review. The fact that Stockwin relied heavily on
Okudaira (supranote 18) may help to explain his "remarkably reluctant" statement.
20. This thesis reflects in part the thinking of Chalmers Johnson in Japan: Who Governs? An Essay on the Official Bureaucracy,2 JOURNAL OF JAPANESE STUDIES 1 (1975). John-

son suggests the need to conceptualize bureaucracy in Japan as a constant contender for
power and to avoid the speculative search for answers to bureaucratic preeminence. Professor Michael E. Smith of Boalt Hall, School of Law, University of California, Berkeley,
brought to the author's attention the idea that the historical behavior of the United States
Supreme Court is explainable in terms of a drive for political power. Also, study of the
shaky beginnings of the American court made the author impatient with undue criticism of
the recently established Japanese court.
The author's thesis is reinforced by the perceptive comments of two analysts of Japanese judicial behavior. Professor David Danelski remarked that restraint in the Japanese
court's early period may have been its best strategy. Danelski, The People and the Court in
Japan, FRoNTmRs OF JUDICIAL RESEARCH 45, 72 (J. Grossman & J. Tenenhaus ed. 1969).
Professor John 0. Haley noted that until the 1975 decision cited in note 10, supra, the
Japanese Supreme Court had exercised its power with manifest caution, effectively avoiding
political risk even when invalidating statutes, "perhaps rightly" declining nearly always to
overturn legislative enactments. Haley, The Freedom to Choose an Occupation and the
ConstitutionalLimits of Legislative Discretion-K.K.Sumiyoshi v. Governor of Hiroshima
Prefecture, 8 LAW IN JAPAN 188, 188-89 (1975).
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Following this Section introducing the controversy over the
role of the Japanese Supreme Court, Section II describes the social, historical and political foundations of the postwar development of constitutional law. This Section focuses upon the powerful, resilient tradition of social conformity and group loyalty.
Section HI deals with the development of the power of judicial
review, noting that one of the first significant invitations to invalidate a statute was a highly political attack on a fundamental governmental policy.
Section IV deals with the factors that have led to the restrained use of judicial review. The violent controversy over the
peace clause is analyzed in Section IV.A. A major postwar political
issue, the rearmament controversy has profoundly influenced judicial action.
Section IV.B discusses other political factors, such as the conservative nature of judicial appointees and their role as part of the
larger elite bureaucracy. Also treated in Section IV.B is the Court's
response to the central problem in recent Japanese political history: how to control and hold accountable the central government.
Section IV.C describes how social values affect attitudes toward law and litigation.
Section IV.D looks into characteristics of the Japanese legal
profession that have militated against more active use of judicial
review. Trained in the civil law system of jurisprudence, which
stresses technical application of authoritative legal codes, Japanese
judges faced great obstacles in learning policy-oriented constitutional adjudication, a feature of the unfamiliar American common
law system.
Section IV.E points out the conflict between the idea of judicial review and a constitution which stresses parliamentary
supremacy.
Section IV.F describes how the manner in which the judiciary
is organized and in which Supreme Court justices are appointed
has impeded the use of judicial review. The Supreme Court, for
instance, has the distracting responsibility of appointing and disciplining lower court judges. Also, justices are appointed for brief
terms, diminishing the opportunity to develop expertise in constitutional law.
Section V discusses the recent increase in judicial review.
Section VI is the conclusion.
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BACKGROUND

The Pre-1946 Constitutional Order in Social, Historical

and Political Perspective.
To appreciate fully the remarkable developments in Japanese
law since 1946, it is essential to understand the basic characteristics of the pre-1946 constitutional order, including not only formal
institutions, but also the underlying social, historical, and political
reality. Pre-war Japan, superficially analyzed, consisted of recognizable western institutions (e.g., monarchy, parliament). The dynamic force, however, was and remains a particularly intense conformity to the social order.21
It is important to understand traditional Japanese values because these ideals of social conformity and group loyalty stand in
stark contrast to the individualist values so strongly reflected in
the Constitution of 1947. Given these traditional values, it is
scarcely surprising that the Japanese Supreme Court has not chosen to interpret the individual rights clauses of the Constitution as
absolute restrictions upon governmental action. It is important
also to note how Japan has historically responded to foreign influences. Foreign techniques and ideas which reinforced Japanese values have been embraced; alien ways which threatened harmony
and order have been suppressed. In particular, "universal" foreign
ideas (such as justice or equality) have been rejected in favor of the
ideal of unqualified loyalty to the group. Traditionally, there has
been no "higher law" to which an individual could appeal to resist
group demands. The community itself has been the source of ultimate value. As Robert Bellah has pointed out, the system of social
relations rather than a system of ideas, has always been ultimately
sacred in Japan. 22
The postwar reception of the Western legal concept of judicial
review must be viewed in light of this traditional antipathy to universal ideals. Applying the universal, individualist principles of the
new Constitution to community decisions (i.e., acts of the Diet) via
the mechanism of judicial review is a remarkable break with tradi21. T. ISHMA, JAPANESE SOCIETY 37 (1971).
22. Bellah, Ienaga Saburo-and the Search for Meaning in Modern Japanin

JAPANESE ArruDs TowARD

MODETNIZATION

CHANGING

374 (M. Jansen ed. 1965). For more insight

into Japanese values, see generally R. BE..AH, TOKUGAWA RELIGION (1957), and R. BELJLA,
BEYOND BELIEF (1970) chapters 3, 4, 6 and 7. Bellah explicitly sets forth his concept of the
Japanese value pattern at pp. 116-17 of the latter work.
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tion. Within the traditional value system, however, there existed a
strong element of adaptability which may help to explain the ability of the Japanese judiciary (and indeed the Japanese nation) to
change course so sharply after World War II.
Traditional Chinese and Japanese cultures had in common the
element of Confucianism, which emphasized the importance of
conformity to the social order. In the case of Japan, however, conformity did not mean that attitudes were static, or that there was
a reluctance to change the existing situation. Rather, it implied
conformity to the changing situation. For instance, at the beginning of the modernization of Japan, the people, led by the governing elite, responded rapidly and almost unanimously to the
need for westernization.2
This conformity is dynamic in a second respect also: it is comPeople attempt to out-do one another in attaining group
petitive.
24
goals.

This ideal of conformity to the group has ancient roots. From
prehistoric times, aspects of wet rice culture, such as maintaining
irrigation systems, required a high degree of social cooperation and
resulted in a strong pressure to conform within the peasant family
and the village. 5
The activist, competitive component of the group ideology
stems from "the traditional warrior ethic, which emphasizes the
importance of dynamic action, rather than passive adjustment to
' 26
the status quo.

Foreign techniques and ideas were extensively introduced into
Japan at several points in prewar history. Always, however, these
ideas were utilized to buttress central political authority, consistent with the ideology of conformity.2 7 For instance, in the momentous Taika Reform of the seventh century, although government
was remodeled along the lines of T'ang China for the purpose of
strengthening imperial rule, the potentially revolutionary Chinese
concept of the Mandate of Heaven was neglected. According to
23. IsHIDA, supra note 21, at 37.
24. Id. at 38.
25. T. SMrrH, THE AGRARIAN ORIGINS OF MODERN JAPAN 208-10 (1959); ISHIDA, supra
note 21, at 39; Y. NODA, INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE LAW xiv (1976); C. BLACK, M. JANSEN, H.
LEviNE, M. TERRY, H. ROSoVSKy, G. RozmAN, H. SmITH & Z. STARR, THE MODERNIZATION OF
JAPAN AND RussiA 49 (1975) [hereinafter cited as BLACK].
26. ISHIDA, supra note 21, at 38-39.
27. Personal conversation with Professor Robert N. Bellah, University of California,
Berkeley (Feb. 26, 1975).
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this concept, "as long as a sovereign rules well, he enjoys the Mandate or approval of Heaven, but, should he rule badly, he thereby
forfeits the Mandate, and it then becomes legitimate for the people
to overthrow him and establish another sovereign in his place."2 s
A second challenge to group loyalty occurred in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries in the form of vigorous
Christian missionary activity. Although the missionaries were initially tolerated in order to promote trade, they were eventually expelled and their converts persecuted because of fear of the subversive consequences of the Christian doctrine requiring resistance to
an unjust ruler.
Following unification of Japan in 1603 by the Shogun Tokugawa Ieyasu (founder of the Tokugawa dynasty), a drastic seclusion policy was enforced to exclude such heterodox ideas. The
unity forged by the centuries of isolation persists to this day in
social attitudes which stress conformity to group expectations.
In addition to isolating the country, the Tokugawa adopted
another means of minimizing conflict among the military aristocracy (the samurai). The samurai were moved from their feudal
land holdings to the castle towns, where they were assigned official
rather than military duties. This political elite, competing for
scarce jobs, came to accept the necessity and validity of "bureaucratic structures and of loyal and effective performance within
them." 9
In the mid-nineteenth century, Japan was subjected to a series
of humiliating western encroachments.30 The aristocratic bureaucrats who led several provinces joined forces to overthrow the decadent central government, which seemed incapable of responding
effectively to the western incursions. 81 These provincial leaders
"restored" the emperor to his throne, casting out the hereditary
Tokugawa shoguns who for centuries had ruled in the name of the
emperor. This successful revolt is known as the Meiji
Restoration. 2
The new government acted effectively to modernize and thus
strengthen Japan vis-a-vis the West. The Meiji oligarchs created a
28. D. BODDE, CHINA'S CULTURAL TRADITION 55 (1957). For the background of this concept, see E. REiscHAuER and J. FAmANK, EAST Aszm THE GREAT TRADITION 50, 81 (1960).
29. T. NAJirrA, JAPAN 144 (1974).

30. ITOH & BEER, supra note 1, at 3.
31. See A. CRAiG, CHOSHU IN THE MEWT RESTORATION (1961).
32. Meiji was the name given to the period in which the Emperor Mutsushito reigned,
1868-1912.
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centralized state on the European model with a parliament and a
very powerful bureaucracy. But two features of this new regime
eventually led to its destruction. First, it was calculatedly left unclear whether the military and the Cabinet were responsible to the
parliament or to the figurehead emperor. Second, to gain popular
support, skillful propaganda techniques were employed to harness
popular emotions by portraying the emperor as the transcendent
object of loyalty.
When the astute architects of this system passed from the
scene, parliament briefly held sway, but then power devolved onto
the military. The essentially religious veneration of the emperor
gradually intensified. Spiritual mobilization accompanied military
and economic mobilization as Japan went to war. The traditional
values of conformity and loyalty were molded into an irrational,
racist totalitarian ideology. Devotion to this ideology led the Japanese people to crushing defeat in World War II and to an unprecedented, humiliating foreign occupation. 3
III.

POSTWAR DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL
AUTHORITY

Article 81 of the new Constitution provided that "[t]he Supreme Court is the court of last resort with power to determine the
constitutionality of any law, order, regulation, or official act."
Japanese students of continental law initially proposed that
the new Supreme Court adopt the role of a special constitutional
33. The developments of the period from the Meiji Restoration to World War I are
summarized in ITOH & BEER, supra note 1, at 3-5, upon which the above discussion is based.
The following excerpt captures the essence of the Imperial ideology:.
The locus of constitutional sovereignty was the emperor, and during nearly
six decades of Japanese life under the Meiji Constitution the centrality of the
emperor increased, as the transcendent object of loyalty and as the formal basis of
legitimate power for competing political interests. In the latter function, the emperor's role resembled the usual status that the imperial house had held in the
previous 1,000 years.
In Japan's modern ideology, long and thoroughly disseminated by techniques
of education and control, the emperor was viewed with great awe as the morethan-human father of the island family of Japan, with roots deep in Japan's mythical and historical past. The emperor was above and beyond politics, and worthy
of the total self-sacrifice of each of his subjects. However ugly politics and war
might become, all blood.members of the "national family" (a literal translation of
the Japanese term for the State, kokka) could bask together in his benevolent
presence, in a warm aura of security, belonging, solidarity, and mentally isolated
superiority over other peoples. (Id., footnotes omitted).
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court.3 4 Rejecting this continental model, the Japanese Supreme
Court first indicated in dicta that it interpreted the new constitution as establishing American style judicial review.3 5 The Court an6 that "Article
nounced in 1948 in Komatsu v. Japan"
81 of our
Constitution should be characterized as an explicit provision
adopting the type of judicial review which has been established in
'37
the U.S. by way of mere interpretation of the Constitution.
Shortly after the Occupation ended in 1952, the question of
whether continental or American style judicial review would prevail was squarely presented. Suzuki Mosaburo, then secretary-general of one of the opposition parties, directly petitioned the Supreme Court to declare the recently established paramilitary police
reserve unconstitutional as a violation of Article 9."3 (This police
reserve had been created to replace American troops dispatched
from Japan to fight in Korea.)
First, Suzuki argued that the American Supreme Court, lacking express constitutional authority to determine the constitutionality of laws, was limited to reviewing statutes for constitutionality
in the process of deciding cases. In contrast, the Japanese Supreme Court, explicitly empowered by Article 81 to determine the
constitutionality of any law, must have the authority to pass upon
statutes in the abstract, because "surely blanket authority expressly granted must mean something more than no provision at
al."39

34. There are two main forms of judicial review, distinguished by the type of court

performing the function. Cappelletti, Judicial Review in Comparative Perspective, 58 CAL.
L. REV. 1017, 1033-34 (1970). The first is the general-jurisdiction court, typified by the
United States Supreme Court. In such a court, all types of cases are heard, primarily civil
and criminal appeals, many of which involve the issue of constitutionality. The second is the

special constitutional court, typified by the Federal Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof) of West Germany. See West German Const., art. 93 et seq. (1947). This type of
court originated in Austria in 1920. See Austrian Const., art. 140 et seq. (1920). In the latter

type of tribunal, only cases involving the constitutionality of laws are heard. Often cases
come before such a court in the form of abstract questions such as "Is this law constitutional?"-rather than in actual controversies in which liberty or property is at stake.
35. Komatsu v. Japan, 2 Keishu 801, 806 (Sup. Ct., G.B., July 8, 1948), cited in
Okudaira, supra note 15, at 70.
36. Id.
37. Quoted in Okudaira, supra note 15, at 70.
38. Suzuki v. Japan, 6 Minshii 783 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Oct. 8, 1952), cited in Wada, supra
note 17, at 119, reprinted in MAJU, supra note 1, at 362.
39. Henderson, Japanese Judicial Review of Legislation: The First Twenty Years, in
CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN, supra note 1, at 120-21.
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Second, Suzuki argued that Article 7940 was included in the

Japanese Constitution precisely because the Japanese court was
authorized to function as a special constitutional court. Thus, because the court had such significant powers, it was necessary to
provide, in contrast to the United States, for periodic popular review of justices, requiring dismissal if a majority so voted.
Third, Suzuki argued that because of the high qualifications
required of justices by Article 41 of the Court Organization Law, 1
they were qualified to issue abstract pronouncements on constitutional issues.' 2
In Suzuki v. Japan, a unanimous Court flatly rejected the
plaintiff's arguments, holding that the Court had power to consider
only constitutional questions raised in concrete legal disputes. The
Court noted that though Suzuki based his petition on Article 81,
the language of this article only referred to a "court of last resort."
The Suzuki Court reasoned that if it had the power to make such
abstract judgments, statutes would be frequently challenged, possibly resulting in the Court dominating the other two branches of
government, "violating the basic principle of democratic government; that the three powers are independent, equal, and immune
from each other's interference."'4
It is noteworthy that this definitive statement on the manner
in which judicial review would be exercised arose out of a highly
political attack on the government, based on the emotional rearmament issue. Given the unstable domestic scene of 1952 and the
fighting raging in nearby Korea, it is not surprising that the Court
sought to avoid reaching a result requiring disbanding of the
40. Article 79 (2)(3) of the Japanese Constitution provides:
(2) The appointment of the judges of the Supreme Court shall be reviewed by the
people at the first general election of members of the House of Representatives
following their appointment, and shall be reviewed again at the first general election of members of the House of Representatives after a lapse of ten (10) years,
and in the same manner thereafter.
(3) In cases mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, when the majority of the voters
favors the dismissal of a judge, he shall be dismissed.
41. Article 41(1) of the Court Organization Law provides in part: "Justices of the Supreme Court shall be appointed from among persons of broad vision and extensive knowledge of law, who are not less than 40 years of age." Also, it is provided that ten of the fifteen
justices must have been either (a) district or High Court judges with at least ten years of
experience, or (b) summary court judges, prosecutors, lawyers, or law professors with at
least twenty years experience. The complete text of Article 41(1) is set forth in note 163
infra.
42. MAKi,supra note 1, at 364.
43. Id.
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"police reserve."
The Court's early perceptions of its role in the political order
were thus shaped by the type of cases which came before it.
Suzuki, and others, 44 sought to use the Court to emasculate the
Cabinet. The Court's effort to avoid destabilizing the government
was reflected in the tone of its doctrinal pronouncement: the language about how each branch is "immune" from interference by
the others seems an extreme reaction to Suzuki's plea. Literal immunity would negate any judicial review of governmental acts. In
sum, the Court's long-standing caution in exercising the power of
judicial review, stems to a significant degree from overreaction to
radical efforts to use the judiciary to undermine (or at least embarrass) the elected government.
As will be discussed in greater detail below, 5 the Sunakawa
case, Japan v. Sakata,6 later enunciated the political question
doctrine as a means whereby the Court could avoid deciding cases
concerning major political issues involving powers of the other
branches of government.
In Sakagami v. Japan,7 the Supreme Court declared an act of
the Diet unconstitutional for the first time. This case was decided
in 1953, about 18 months after the lifting of the Occupation. This
decision was of limited significance, however, because it involved a
law which was no longer in effect. Also, it is hard to tell what the
case stands for, owing to the complex series of laws involved and
the multiple opinions written.' a
44. E.g., in Tomabechi v. Japan, 7 Minshiu 305 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Apr. 15, 1953), cited in
Henderson, in CoNsTrrtrnoN oF JAPAN, supra note 1, at 122, reprinted in MAi, supra note

1, at 366, the Court refused to hear an appeal by an opposition member of the Diet that a
Cabinet order dissolving the lower house was unconstitutional on the ground (citing Suzuki
v. Japan, 6 Sai-han Minsh7 783 (1952)) that there was no legal dispute.
45. See text accompanying notes 72-78, infra.

46. Japan v. Sakata (the Sunakawa case) 13 Keish-u 3225 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Dec. 16, 1959),
cited in Wada, supra note 17, at 120, reprinted in MAKu, supra note 1 at 298. See text

accompanying notes 72-78 infra.
47. Sakagami v. Japan, 7 Sai-han Keishil 1562 (1953).
48. The Occupation authorities, who had initially freed leftwing political prisoners and
otherwise given dissenters free rein, later became alarmed by Communist successes in China
and Korea and by vigorous domestic protests. On June 26, 1950, the day after the Communist invasion of South Korea, General MacArthur banned a Communist newspaper called

the Red Flag (Akahata) and any successor publications. Implementing MacArthur's directive, an appropriate Cabinet order was issued by the formal government. Henderson, in
CONSTrrUTnON OF JAPAN, supra note 1, at 128-29.
Sakagami renamed the proscribed newspaper the Voice of Peace (Heiwa no koe) and
defiantly continued publication. His conviction for violating the order in question was eventually reversed by the Supreme Court by a vote of ten to four. Though agreeing on the
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The second case in which the Court voided a Diet enactment
was that of Nakamura v. Japan.49 This case is more significant
than Sakagami because it involved a statute that was effective at
the time the decision was rendered.
The defendants in Nakamura, attempting to smuggle 18 bales
of textiles to South Korea, rendezvoused with a fishing boat off the
coast of KyfshTI, Japan's southern-most island. Stormy weather
frustrated the defendants' efforts to transfer their illegal cargo
aboard the fishing boat. While retreating to the nearby Japanese
city of Fukuoka, the defendants were apprehended.
The local district court not only found them guilty of smuggling but also confiscated their boat and cargo under Customs Law
Article 118, paragraph one. 50 The trial court established that the
cargo actually belonged to a third party.
On appeal, the defendants argued in part that confiscation of
the goods of a third party, who had not been given notice or a
judgment, the majority split six to four on the basis for holding the statutes unconstitutional. (When the Occupation ended, the Cabinet orders under which the defendant had
been convicted were extended by a vote of the Diet. These interim statutes were designed to
be effective only during the transition to Japanese rule.)
Six justices would have reversed because of technical flaws in the manner in which the
Diet tried to extend the validity of the Occupation orders. Four justices perceived no technical flaws, but felt that the newspaper ban was substantively inconsistent with Article 21, the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression. The four dissenters argued that while the
statutes in question could not constitutionally extend the effect of the Occupation order
beyond the April 28, 1952, signing of the peace treaty, it was not improper to apply the law
to offenses committed during the Occupation. It had been previously decided that the Occupation legal structure existed entirely outside the Japanese Constitution, whether of 1889 or
1947. Hasegawa v. Japan, 7 Sai-han Keishil 775, 787-88 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Apr. 18, 1953), cited
in Henderson, in CoNsTrrutioN OF JAPAN, supra note 1 at 130.
49. Nakamura v. Japan, 16 Sai-han Keish-i 1593 (1962).
50. Customs Law, Article 118, paragraph one provides:
Cargo related to the crimes provided in Articles 109 through 111 (crime of importing prohibited cargo, crime of avoiding customs, etc. and crime of exporting or
importing without permit), ships or airplanes used in the commission of such
crimes, or cargo related to the crime provided in Article 112 (crime of transport,
etc. of smuggled cargo, hereinafter referred to as "criminal cargo" in this article)
shall be confiscated. However, this shall not apply to criminal cargo owned by a
party other than the criminal and when such party comes under any one of the
following items:
(1) When it is found that he has continuously maintained the criminal cargo
as owner without knowing in advance that one or more of the crimes provided in
Articles 109 through 112 were to be committed.
(2) When it is found that he took possession of the criminal cargo without
knowing of the circumstances after one or more of the crimes provided in the
preceding item were committed.
(Reprinted in ITOH & BEER, supra note 1, at 59.)
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hearing, was unconstitutional under Articles 29 (right to own property) 5 and 31 (due process)5 2 of the Constitution.5 3 Although the
Supreme Court affirmed the smuggling conviction without dissent,
it voted ten to five to reverse the confiscation order on the grounds
urged. Specifically, the Nakamura Court held that property belonging to a third party could not constitutionally be seized without providing notice and a chance to be heard. Lacking such procedural provisions, Customs Law Article 118, paragraph one was
invalid."
The Court reasoned that the accused had standing to raise the
issue of third party property rights because the defendants had 1)
been deprived of possession of the property and 2) been exposed to
a possible claim for damages by the third party. The dissenters
argued that the defendants lacked standing to assert constitutional
rights of a third party.
The Court had, just two years earlier, ruled that such a confiscation could not be attacked on the basis of a third party's rights. 5
Despite the fact that the prevailing view among Japanese lawyers
in the early 1960's was that this aspect of the Customs Law was
unconstitutional, the Diet failed
to amend the statute to provide
56
for a hearing for third parties.
It is significant that the Court appeared to give the Diet an
opportunity to amend the statute before declaring it unconstitutional. A similar pattern later occurred regarding reapportionment
of the Diet. District lines had not been redrawn since 1947, despite
very large shifts in population. In rejecting a 1964 constitutional
challenge to the lopsided system, 57 the Court noted that though
apportionment was primarily the responsibility of the Diet, the
Court would interfere if the degree of malapportionment became
serious enough. Indeed, in 1976 the Court took the next step, in51. Article 29, paragraph one of the Japanese Constitution provides: "The right to own

or to hold property is inviolable."
52. Article 31 provides: "No person shall be deprived of life or liberty, nor shall any
criminal penalty be imposed, except according to procedure established by law."
53. Henderson, in CONsTrruTiON oF JAPAN, supra note 1, at 133.
54. Id.
55. Omachi v. Japan, 14 Keishi 1574 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Oct. 19, 1960), cited in Okudaira,
supra note 15, at 84.
56. Okudaira, supra note 15, at 84.

57. Ishiyama v. Tokyo Prefecture Election Commission, 18 MinshU 270 (Sup. Ct., G.B.,
Feb. 5, 1964), cited in Haley, Recent Developments, 9 LAW IN JAPAN 152 (1976), reprinted
in ITOH & BEER,supra note 1, at 53, and excerpted in TANAKA, supra note 1, at 722. The
latter two sources render the plaintiff's name as "Koshiyama."
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validating the districting plan in effect during the 1972 election,
though declining to invalidate the election itself.58

iV. REASONS FOR JUDICIAL RESTRAINT
The following factors have impeded the development in Japan
of the powerful American style of judicial review.
* Judicial reaction to radical efforts to achieve unilateral disarmament in the courts after having failed to achieve this goal through
the political process.
* Other political factors, including the appointment of conservatives to the Court and the unity of outlook among the official
bureaucracy.
* Social attitudes discouraging resort to the legal process to resolve disputes.
* Characteristics of the Japanese legal profession, including the
small number of lawyers and judges, lack of experience in constitutional litigation, civil law modes of thought, and the possible continuance in office of judges who had been committed to the militarist regime.
* The necessarily limited use of judicial review in a system based
upon parliamentary supremacy.
* Impediments inherent in the pattern of judicial organization,
such as the Supreme Court's administrative responsibilities, the
justices' short tenure on the bench, and the unwieldly number of
justices on the court.
A. The "Peace" Clause
Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, the famous "Peace"
clause,5 dominates the postwar constitutional landscape much as
Mt. Fuji dominates central Japan. Article 9 states:
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice
and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sover58. Kurokawa v. Chiba Prefecture Election Commission, 30 Sai-han Minsh 223 (1976).
59. For an account of the origins and early history of the peace clause, see STOCKWIN,
supra note 2, at 176-81.
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eign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means

of settling international disputes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph,
land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never
be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be
recognized.
The Japanese Supreme Court has for a generation been under
a constant barrage of intense left-wing criticism for its refusal 1) to
directly confront the Article 9 constitutional issue and 2) to outlaw
the maintenance of military forces in Japan. Right-wing opinion
has in turn been critical of the court for failure to definitively uphold the Self-Defense Forces (SDF). For instance, novelist
Mishima Yukio committed suicide, denouncing the hypocrisy of
the government in failing to amend Article 9 to legalize the SDF.60
A minority of the Japanese public appears to oppose maintaining military power of any sort;61 a majority of academic commentators appear to share this viewpoint.62 This pacifism stems in
part from "a continuing, radical reaction to Japan's mind-numbing
defeat in World War II. ' 6s Military power is linked to memory of
utter national failure in the war.
Those Japanese interpreting Article 9 as absolutely banning
military power have on several occasions asked the Court to outlaw
military forces maintained by the government. For instance, in
1952 a "progressive"'" politician directly petitioned the Supreme
Court to overturn the law creating a "police reserve" on Article 9
grounds.6 5
The Court has avoided extensive use of the power of judicial
review in part because it desperately wanted to avoid passing upon
the constitutionality of the armed forces.66 Read broadly, Article 9
does forbid military power. Thus, the Court has not only avoided
passing on the validity of the SDF, but also hesitated to strike
down unrelated statutes for fear that active use of judicial review
60. Okudaira, supra note 15, at 105.
61. Seymour, Japan'sSelf-Defense: The Naganuma Case and Its Implications, 47 PACIFIc AFFAmIs 421, 433 (1974-75).
62. Slomanson, supra note 18, at 33, 44.
63. ITOH & BEER, supra note 1, at 5.

64. The term "progressive" is used to refer to the left-wing opposition parties in the
Diet.
65. Suzuki v. Japan, 6 Sai-han MinshU 783 (1952), reprintedin MAyU, supra note 1, at
362-65. See discussion in text accompanying notes 38-44 supra.
66. STOCKWIN, supra note 2, hints at this point at 182.
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in other areas would supply ammunition to foes of the Self-Defense Forces.
Over the years, the strength of the SDF has been increased;
people have been grown accustomed to the paradox of military
might co-existing with Article 9. Thus, the sense of urgency in
avoiding declarations of unconstitutionality has diminished.
The Court has shown sound political judgment in avoiding a
definitive ruling on the meaning of Article 9. If the Court had outlawed the American bases and the SDF, this ruling would likely
have been ignored by the Cabinet; having ignored one judicial decree, the Cabinet would have found it easy to ignore others. At the
same time, the legitimacy of the government would have diminished. The other possible result would have been no more palatable; if the Cabinet had acquiesced in the abolition of the SDF,
this would have increased Japan's exposure to domestic insurrection and foreign invasion.
The consequences of a definitive ruling upholding the constitutionality of the SDF would have been no better. The "progressive" forces would have been discouraged from using the legal process to realize their policy objectives, possibly increasing the risk of
political violence. Popular respect for the court might have declined. Further, the Court could not, given the terms of Article 9,
rationally have said there was no constitutional limit to the armed
forces. Yet, how could it set a specific limit to military might?
Three hundred thousand troops and no more? Tanks, but not
landing craft? Under these circumstances, unqualified endorsement of the SDF might have been perceived as encouraging a drift
toward 1930's-style militarism.
The heated controversy over Article 9 has distracted the Court
from consideration of other constitutional issues. Furthermore, the
"peace clause" debate has had a profound impact on the Court's
perception of the function of judicial review. As noted above," an
early radical attempt to invoke Article 9 to abolish the SDF resulted in a Supreme Court declaration narrowly limiting the scope
of judicial review.
Four key cases illustrate judicial handling of the Article 9
hot potato: the Sunakawa case, 8 the Eniwa case, 9 Japan v.
67. See text accompanying notes 38-44 & 63-64supra.
68. Japan v. Sakata, 13 Sai-han Keishii 3225 (1959).
69. Japan v. Nozaki (the Eniwa case), 9 Kak-iu Keishg 359 (Sapporo Dt. Ct., Mar. 29,
1967), cited in Wada, supra note 17, at 120.
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Sunakawa refused to hold unconstitutional the stationing of
American forces in Japan under the 1951 United States/Japan Security Treaty. 7 Eniwa involved the acquittal on statutory grounds
of persons who pled an Article 9 defense to a charge of damaging
SDF property. Sakane reaffirmed and clarified Sunakawa.
Naganuma, following the Sunakawa precedent, refused to declare
the SDF unconstitutional.
The landmark Sunakawa case of 1959 grew out of a protest
over a plan to extend a runway at the large American air base at
Tachikawa, near Tokyo.7 8 Demonstrators assembled at the adjacent village of Sunakawa on the parcel of farm land that was to be
acquired. Protestors who then entered the base were arrested by
Japanese police for trespassing.
At their trial, the defendants challenged on two separate
grounds the validity of the special trespass law under which they
were charged. First, they argued that the law was invalid because it
had been enacted pursuant to the 1951 Security Treaty, which was
unconstitutional because it sanctioned the maintenance of American forces in Japan, in violation of Article 9. Second, the defendants contended that the trespass law was invalid because it had
merely been promulgated by the Cabinet rather than enacted by
the Diet.
In a decision that electrified Japan, the Tokyo District Court
on March 20, 1959 acquitted the defendants, accepting both of
their principal arguments. 4 Because of the importance of the case,
the Tokyo Public Prosecutor at once appealed directly to the Supreme Court, bypassing the Tokyo High Court. Acting with un70. Japan v. Sakane, 23 Keishii 685 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Apr. 12, 1969), reprinted in ITOH &
BEER, supra note 1, at 103.

71. Minister of Agriculture and Forestry v. ItZ (the Naganuma case), 821 Hanrei Jih3
21 (Sapporo High Ct., Aug. 5, 1976), cited in Haley, Recent Developments, 9 LAW IN JAPAN
153 (1976). This case is still pending before the Supreme Court, but the outcome is not in

doubt.
With the exception of Sakane, each of these cases customarily bears the name of the

town or village in which the matter arose, rather than the name of the parties. Japanese
normally refer to cases by the name of the court and the date of decision. See, e.g., Noda,
Japan, 1 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF Comr. L. J-9 (1975).
72. Multilateral Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, United States-Japan, 3
U.S.T. 3169, T.I.A.S. No. 2490.
73. TANAKA, supra note 1, at 709; MAKI, supra note 1, at 298-99.
74. Japan v. Sakata, 1 Kakyui Keishii 776 (Tokyo Dt. Ct., Mar. 30, 1959), cited in
Wada, supra note 17, at 120; reprinted in 4 JAPANE sE ANN. INT'L L. 97 (1960).
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usual speed, the Supreme Court accepted the appeal on April 3,
1959; oral argument was heard on June 3, 1959.
Though a decision was widely expected by the end of the following September, it took three additional months. The reasons for
the delay became obvious with the release of the opinion. Though
unanimous in reversing the trial court, the justices could not agree
on their reasons. Five justices concurred in the "majority" opinion,
while the remaining ten justices produced eight additional
opinions.
The principal opinion, while not entirely clear, makes the following points in the following order:
1. Article 9 renounces resort to aggressive war, not Japan's inherent right to self-defense. Japan may, therefore, properly enter
into international security agreements.
2. Article 9 governs only "war potential" over which Japan has
"rights of command and control."7 5 Since Japan does not have
such power over American forces stationed in Japan, these forces
are not "war potential" within the meaning of Article 9.
3. Certain highly political matters are the province of the Cabinet and the Diet; these matters are beyond the scope of judicial
review unless patently unconstitutional. The Security Treaty,
bearing "an extremely important relation to the basis of the existence of our country as a sovereign nation," is such a political
question.7 6 (This key portion of the opinion is notably unclear as
written.) The Court continued:
"It is proper to interpret this primarily as a matter that
must be entrusted to the decision of the cabinet, which
possesses the power to conclude treaties, and of the National Diet, which has the power to approve them; and it
ultimately must77 be left to the political review of the sov'
ereign people.
4. The Court then reiterates its point that American forces do
not constitute "war potential" within the meaning of Article 9
(and the preamble to the 1947 Constitution). The Court appears
to say, however, that even assuming American forces are war potential, this does nonetheless not violate Article 9 because their
only purpose is to repel foreign invasion and suppress foreign-inspired insurrection.
5. Though the administrative agreement authorizing the special
75. MAKI, supra note 1, at 303-04.
76. Id. at 305.
77. Id. at 306.
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trespass law was not specifically approved by the Diet, resolutions

disapproving the agreement were rejected. The trespass law, thus,
is valid.
The confusing principal opinion does not make clear why the
Court reviewed the constitutionality of the Security Treaty and
the administrative agreement in addition to stating that they were
not subject to review. Commentators have presumed that the
Court was determining whether or not the treaty was "patently unconstitutional" pursuant to the test set forth in point three,
above.7
The opinions themselves, however, leave the impression that
the Court was split between advocates of disposing of the case on
pure political-question grounds and advocates of substantively reviewing the treaty in light of Article 9. The "majority" opinion
thus seems to represent an uneasy compromise between what
would appear to be mutually exclusive concepts. It is hard to see
what purpose is served by this two-stage political question test. If
all matters must pass constitutional muster, even if clearly entrusted to the Cabinet or the Diet, then the doctrine neither gives
due respect to coordinate branches of government nor helps the
Court avoid certain "hot" questions.
Perhaps the justices of the Sunakawa Court were so emotionally involved with the rearmament question that although basically
convinced that the Court should avoid the issue on political question grounds, they could not let the powerful arguments of the trial
court go unanswered.
Indeed, discussions of Article 9 among Japanese resemble discussions among Americans of the free speech rights of Nazis (or,
during an earlier era, the merits of slavery). Discussions of each
topic generate more heat than light. Feelings about Article 9 evidently stem from the many traumatic experiences of the wartime
period: hunger, privation, loss of loved ones, the fire bombing of
Tokyo, the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, disappointed expectations, and the humiliation of defeat.
An Article 9 case of lesser importance arose in 1962 in the village of Eniwa in Hokkaido (Japan's northernmost island).7 9 Two
brothers, who operated a dairy farm on land adjoining an SDF
firing range, had complained on numerous occasions to the author78. E.g., Okudaira, supra note 15, at 96.
79. Japan v. Nozaki, 9 Kakyi Keishil 359 (1967), cited in Wada, supra note 17, at 120.
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ities that constant noise from the firing range was harming their
cows, causing both decreased milk production and miscarriages °
Their protests ignored, the brothers retaliated by cutting in
several places a field telephone line used to signal firing instructions to the training ground. 1 The brothers were charged with violating the 1954 Self-Defense Forces Law which provided criminal
penalties for damage or destruction of "the weapons, munitions,
airplanes and such other items as are used for the purpose of defense" by the SDF. 2
The opposition parties rallied to the aid of the farmers, seeing
another opportunity to place the Cabinet's defense policy on trial.
The farmers pleaded not guilty on the grounds that the SDF violated Article 9. This case aroused much interest in Japan because
this was the first direct challenge to the constitutionality of the
SDF.
The trial, which took four years, focused on the Article 9 issue,
including testimony from government officials and SDF officers.
(Trial sessions in Japan are typically scheduled to last no more
than one day at a time, with intervening intervals of five or six
83
weeks, during which other matters are heard.)
Progressive hopes were dashed, however, by the 1967 decision
acquitting the brothers on statutory grounds. The trial court held
that the phrase "other items used for defense" included only "vital" items such as weapons and airplanes, not such things as telephone lines. Consistent with its policy of avoiding Article 9 litigation, the government did not appeal the decision. (Criminal
acquittals are appealable in Japan.)"
In the third Article 9 case, Japan v. Sakane, 5 the Supreme
Court rejected a contention that the "New Security Treaty"8 6 (the
1960 renewal of the 1951 United States/Japan Security Treaty) violated the peace clause.
Massive nationwide demonstrations were held to protest the
80. K. Ishimine, A Comparative Study of Judicial Review Under American and Japanese Constitutional Law (unpublished J.S.D. thesis, Cornell University, 1974) at 144.
81. Wada, supra note 17, at 123-24.
82. Ishimine, supra note 80, at 144.
83. See text accompanying note 156 infra.
84. See Nagashima, The Accused and Society: The Administrationof CriminalJustice
in Japan, in LAw IN JAPAN 300-01 (A. von Mehren ed. 1963).
85. Japan v. Sakane, 23 Sa-han Keish-i 685 (1969).
86. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, Jan. 19, 1960, United States-Japan, 11
U.S.T. 1632, T.LA.S. No. 4509.
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1960 renewal of the treaty. One protest was held in the Sendai
courthouse during working hours in the entrance to the High Court
chambers. Convicted of inciting public employees to illegal political action, the defendants appealed on numerous grounds.
Disposing of the Article 9 contention, the Sakane court focused on the political question rationale of Sunakawa, recasting
the 1959 holding into more intelligible form. The Court held: in
passing upon highly political matters which have an important relationship to Japan's existence as a sovereign nation, circumspection is required. So long as the treaty is not clearly contrary to the
Constitution, it should not unnecessarily be held unconstitutional.
In light of Sunakawa, the Court concluded, the New Treaty would
not be deemed to be clearly unconstitutional as violating the intent
of Article 9.
Within three months of the 1969 Sakane decision, yet another
legal challenge to government foreign and defense policy was
mounted. The Japanese government, pursuant to treaties with the
United States, had decided to construct a Nike surface-to-air missile base in a national forest near the small town of Naganuma on
the northern island of Hokkaido.
After tumultous public hearings on the question of transferring the land from the national forest to the Air Self-Defense
Force, the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry announced removal of the conservation designation on July 7, 1969.11 Construction of the base began that same day. Also that same day, local
residents (aided by pacifist groups) filed two separate actions opposing the base in Sapporo District Court (the same court that had
decided Eniwa in 1967). Both suits attacked the decision of the
Minister of Agriculture and Forestry lifting the national forest designation of the land in question.
The first action sought suspension of the Minister's order on
grounds of increased flood danger. The second action sought reversal of the order on the grounds that it was not in the public interest, as required by statute. 8 The order was not in the public interest, it was alleged, because establishing a missile base (or any sort
of military force) violated Article 9.
87. The following account of the Naganuma case is drawn largely from three sources:

John 0. Haley's summaries of the case in 9 LAw INJAPAN 151, 153-54 (1976), Haley, Recent
Developments, 6 LAW IN JAPAN 173, 175-76 (1973) and Seymour, supra note 61, at 433.
88. Forest Law (Shinrin HU), art. 26(2), Law No. 249 (1951) quoted in Haley, supra
note 87, 6 LAW IN JAPAN 175.
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In August, 1969, Judge Fukushima of the Sapporo District
Court ordered suspension, 9 as asked in the first suit, but the Sapporo High Court quickly (January, 1970) reversed on the ground
that since adequate measures had been taken to prevent flooding,
there was no urgent necessity to prevent irreparable damage, as
required by statute. 90 Construction of the base was completed in
June, 1972.
In the second suit, 27 hearings were held over a four year period."1 With decision pending in the second suit, also in the hands
of Judge Fukushima, the Chief Judge of the District Court wrote
92
Fukushima a letter telling him to dismiss the Article 9 claim,
thus igniting a lengthy controversy. After several hearings on the
Article 9 question, when Fukushima's antagonistic position had become evident, the government unsuccessfully tried to get him removed from the case.93
Finally, in September, 1973, Fukushima handed down the decision that had been anticipated, holding that not only had the forest land been illegally reclassified, but also that the law establishing the SDF violated Article 9." Acting with remarkable
independence, Fukushima rejected the political question doctrine
of Sunakawa and Sakane:
Whenever the constitutionality of a statute is questioned, the
matter inevitably involves a question of a more or less political
nature ....
If one excludes some acts of the government from
the scope of judicial review by relying on a dangerously overbroad
interpretation of such a vague concept, one might lead the way to
closing the doors of the court to people asking for redress for the
blundering of the government."
On the very first day of litigation (August 22, 1969), Judge
Fukushima had stated that the constitutionality of the SDF should
89. t5 v. Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, 565 Hanrei Jih5 23 (1969); 238 Hanrei
Taimuzu 287 (Sapporo Dt. Ct., Aug., 1969), cited in Haley, supra note 87, 6 LAW IN JAPAN
175.
90. Administrative Case Litigation Law of 1962, quoted in Haley, supra note 87, 6 LAW
IN JAPAN 175.
91. Seymour, supra note 61, at 428.
92. Id. at 427; see note 178 infra.
93. Id.
94. It5 v. Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, 712 Hanrei Jihb 24 (1973); 298 Hanrei
Taimuzu 140 (Sapporo DL Ct, Sept. 7, 1973), cited in Wada, supra note 17, at 125, summarized in Haley, supra note 87, 6 LAW IN JAPAN 175-76 and excerpted in TANAKA, supranote
1, at 712.
95. TANAKA, supra note 1, at 714.
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be judged "in view of what the SDF really are in conjunction with
the spirit of the Constitution." 6 Indeed, Fukushima must have
ruled as the "spirit" moved him. He certainly did not follow the
relevant Supreme Court precedents.
The government offered to consent to a special appeal directly
to the Supreme Court, but plaintiffs refused and the case was routinely heard by the Sapporo High Court.
The Court heard nine sessions of oral testimony before abruptly terminating the proceedings. Shortly afterwards, the unanimous three-judge court dismissed the action without reaching the
merits of the constitutional issue. The Court held that under relevant statutes, 7 the plaintiffs could bring an administrative action
only if they had the required legal interest to sue.98 Only where the
challenged governmental action actually infringed or could be expected to infringe a legal interest was this requirement met.
Though the plaintiffs did originally have a sufficiently concrete and
individual interest in preserving the watershed for farming and
flood control, the Court reasoned "this interest was extinguished
by the new water conservation facilities that the government had
built."99 Thus, lacking the requisite legal interest, plaintiffs no
longer had standing to sue.
Applying the political question doctrine, the Court reasoned, it
is clear that the constitutionality of the SDF is not justiciable unless the SDF are in apparent violation of Article 9. The SDF, the
Court concluded, are not in obvious violation of Article 9; this issue depends upon the construction given Article 9.
Despite vocal demands from both the left and the right to definitively resolve the question of the constitutionality of the SDF
under Article 9, the Japanese Supreme Court has wisely avoided
that thorny question. In the 1959 Sunakawa decision, however, the
Court did indicate in dicta that Article 9 did not prohibit defensive
measures.
Determination to avoid ruling on the SDF has also tended to
make the Court reluctant to actively exercise judicial review in
other legal areas. As the Article 9 issue has declined in urgency,
96. Japan Times, Aug. 23, 1969, at 3, quoted in Seymour, supra note 60, at 427.
97. The Court Organization Law, art. 3, Law No. 59 (1947), and Administrative Case
Litigation Law of 1962, art. 9, Law No. 139, cited in Haley, Recent Developments, 9 LAw IN
JAPAN,

151, 154 (1976).

98. Minister of Agriculture and Forestry v. Ito (the Naganuma case) 821 Hanrei Jihb 21
(Sapporo High Ct., Aug. 5, 1976), summarized in Haley, supra note 97, at 153.
99. Haley, supra note 97, at 154.
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however, the Court has become more willing to invalidate acts of
the Diet.
B. Political Factors.
1) Conservative Judicial Appointees.
The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and its conservative
predecessors have dominated Japanese politics 'since,the first postwar parliamentary election was held in 1946.10 These consistently
conservative Cabinets have appointed conservatives to the Supreme Court. 10 1 These appointees have thus been predisposed to
support government actions. Decisions upholding laws which, for
instance, discourage anti-government political demonstrations are
therefore not "remarkable". 0 2
2) Bureaucratic Unity.
It is important to consider, however, more than the partisan
political orientations of court appointees. Attention must also be
given to the remarkable homogeneity in basic social and political
assumptions of Japan's political elite.103
Following the Meiji Restoration of 1868, Japanese government
was radically restructured along the lines of a centralized European state, including creation of a truly national bureaucracy selected by merit. In the late 19th century, the power of the Meiji
oligarchs came under attack from nascent political parties in the
Diet. To prevent the political parties from seizing power, the oligarchs .deliberately set up an entrenched official bureaucracy,
which would make policy on its own.
Two subsequent events further increased the influence of the
bureaucracy. First, in the 1930's, central economic planning was in100. A center-left coalition government ruled Japan briefly in 1947-48. See STOCKWIN,
supra note 2, at 54-56.
101. Ishida, supra note 21, at 76.
102. E.g., the Tokyo Ordinance decision of 1960, Japan v. Ito, 14 Keish-u 1243 (Sup. Ct.,
G.B., July 20, 1960), cited in Beer, The Public Welfare Standard and Freedom of Expression in Japanin CONsTrrtmoN OF JAPAN, supra note 1, at 230, and reprintedin MAKI, supra
note 1, at 84. See Beer, supra, for an analysis of the political significance of the "demonstration" decisions. The Court has repeatedly invoked the "public welfare standard" to limit
constitutionally-protected individual rights. See Okudaira, supra note 15, at 83-91. Through
the above standard, the Court appears to have articulated in constitutional terms the traditional Japanese concern for collective over individual rights. See also note 133 infra.
103. BLACK, supra note 25, at 265.
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stituted to further the war effort.104 Second, in the postwar era,
Occupation policies such as the "purge" of politicians and military
officers removed the bureaucracy's competitors for power. Other
Occupation policies, such as indirect rule and the extension of eco°5
nomic controls further strengthened bureaucratic influence.
As is the case with the Polytechnique in France, the Japanese
political elite attends the same schools, shares the same values,
and controls the official bureaucracy. From the late 19th century to
the present, the key to leadership positions in government or business in Japan has been a bachelor's degree in law from a prestigious university. 10 6
In addition, the system of promotion by seniority (but with adequate allowance for merit)-a system common to virtually all
Japanese organizations in the modern sector-assures that those
in key positions of power at any one time will be of the identical
generation. Thus, whether a man is a business executive, a section
chief in the bureaucracy, or a member of the national Diet, the
chances are that he will have attended a prestige university, that
he will be of a predictable age, and that he will share very much
107
the same values and style of life.
Judges are also members of this political elite and thus share
similar educational experiences and political assumptions. 20 8
Thirty-seven of the forty-nine judges appointed to the Supreme
Court between 1947 and 1970 were graduates of the prestigious law
faculty of Tokyo University.1 0 9 Judges are thus a manifestation of
a single bureaucracy, rather than a separate branch of
government.11 0
The "sustained unity of the elite" 1 1 might come under stress
if the LDP loses power in the future. A "conservative" Supreme
Court might scrutinize more carefully legislation enacted by a
"progressive" Cabinet. In addition to partisan or philosophical
104. ISHIDA, supra note 21, at 73.
105. See ISHIDA, supra note 21, at 74.
106. NODA, supra note 25, at 141; Henderson, Abstract of Japanese Lawyers: Types
and Roles in the Legal Profession, 3 LAW AND SOCIETY REVIEw 411-13 (1969); BLACK, supra
note 25, at 269.
107. BLACK, supra note 25, at 269-70.
108. Dator, The Life History and Attitudes of Japanese High Court Judges, 17 W.
POLITICAL

Q. 408, 438 (1967).

109. Okudaira, supra note 15, at 74.
110. Dator, supra note 108, at 438.
111. BLACK, supra note 25, at 268.
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differences, the demands of bureaucratic territoriality might take
on increased urgency. As Chalmers Johnson has noted,
"[j]urisdictional disputes 2 appear to be the very life-blood of the
11
Japanese bureaucracy.

Facing a "progressive" Cabinet, the Court might become more
alert to invasions of judicial prerogatives. The Japanese court has
in the past resisted interference from other agencies of government. In 1949, for instance, an effort by a Diet committee to rehash an unpopular decision by a lower court was forcefully
rebuffed. 113
On this occasion, the Judiciary Committee of the House of
Councillors (the upper house) had announced an investigation of a
trial court's decision to impose a light penalty in an infanticide
case. 11 4 In a letter to the committee, the court stated that 1) the

Diet had overstepped its authority, 2) the legislative power to investigate granted by Article 62115 of the Constitution did not authorize investigation of the judiciary, and 3) the courts alone were
empowered to determine the facts and penalties in legal cases.
3) Unitary versus Federal Political Structure.
A federal political structure is a key factor in the development
of powerful national supreme courts.11 6 Such national tribunals
have proven useful in defining the respective powers of national
and provincial governments. 17
In 1947, Japan presented a quite different environment to the
newly-created Japanese Supreme Court. The national government
had militarily defeated the last serious provincial challenge to central control in the late 19th century. Today, as in 1947, Japan is a
unitary state, with a system of centrally-controlled local administrative districts modeled on the French prefecture.
Thus, the absence of federal/provincial tensions is a factor
112. Johnson, MITI and Japanese InternationalEconomic Policy, in THE FOREIGN
(R.Scalapino ed. 1977).
113. MAKI, supra note 1, at xliii, xliv.
114. Dionisopoulos, supra note 14, at 271-72.
115. Article 62 of the Japanese Constitution provides: "Each House may conduct investigations in relation to government and may demand the presence and testimony of witnesses and the production of records."
116. BECKER, supra note 5, at 219-20; J. TANENHAus, 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL SCIENCES 304 (D.
Sills ed. 1968).
117. See, e.g., Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). See R. McCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME CouRT 59-60 (1960).
POLICY OF MODERN JAPAN 231
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which helps to explain why the Japanese Supreme Court has not
developed into a highly influential institution. Additional insight
may be obtained into the reasons for the Court's actions by more
closely examining the tribunal's relationship to the central question in recent Japanese political history. The central problem facing the new American court and nation in the early 19th century
was whether the central government would prevail over provincial
governments. By contrast, the central problem in Japanese politics
has been who controls the powerful central government, especially
the entrenched bureaucracy. The brilliant band of revolutionaries
that overthrew the shogunate in 1868 designed a very unusual constitutional order in which sovereignty mystically resided in the emperor. The emperor, however, did not rule personally; the Meiji
oligarchs ruled in his name. The Cabinet and military were responsible to "the emperor", i.e., the Meiji oligarchs.
In the 1920's, the vacuum created by the eventual deaths of
the oligarchs was for a time filled by a system of parliamentary
democracy in which the Cabinet was responsible to the Diet. Due
in part to the corruption of this system, in the late 1930's the military gradually came to control the central government.
After defeat in World War II, Japan was occupied by the Allies. The Occupation sought to deal with this basic problem of who
controlled the central government by clarifying lines of authority
in the new Constitution of 1947. The framers made clear that the
Diet, elected by the people, was the "highest organ of state
power".1 1 8 Notwithstanding the Constitution, many Japanese, horrified by the consequences of military rule, shared a vision of the
future involving the recreation of the parliamentary democracy of
the 1920's.
The military posed no threat to the constitutional order after
1945. Total demobilization was followed by "purge" edicts which
banned all former military officers from holding important posts.
Instead, both American Occupation authorities and Japanese officials came to perceive the principal threat to order as coming from
the left.
In the early years after the adoption of the United States Constitution, the principal antagonists of the central government had
been certain states. The American Supreme Court sought to sup118. Article 41 of the Japanese Constitution provides: "The Diet shall be the highest
organ of state power, and shall be the sole law-making organ of the state."
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port the fledgling federal government by enhancing the power of
Congress 19 and by limiting state authority. 120
In the early years of the postwar Japanese Constitution, the
principal antagonists of the central government have been leftist
political groups. The Japanese Court has sought to support the
new government by enhancing the power of the Diet and by limiting the influence of the "progressive" groups.
To achieve its ends, the early American Court (under Chief
Justice John Marshall) created1 21 and maximized1 22 the power of
judicial review. To achieve its ends, the early Japanese Court minimized1 23 the explicitly granted power of judicial review.
Several notable Japanese litigants seeking judicial invalidation
of Diet-passed laws were members of leftwing political parties that
1 24
had won insufficient seats in the Diet to carry out their policies.
The Court firmly rejected these and other efforts to undercut parliamentary authority.
4) Attempts to Revise the Constitution.
Especially in the early postwar years, there was some resentment among Japanese in general over the forced adoption of the
foreign-authored "Japanese" Constitution. Conservatives additionally objected to that document's radical content. 2 5 The document
was initially drafted in six days by the Occupation authorities and
then presented as a fait accompli to the Japanese government.1 26
Changes were made only with the consent of SCAP. 27 The Constitution was seen as radical in that it placed heavy emphasis upon
individual rights.1 28 Article 14, for instance, states: "All of the peo119. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) and
note 117, at 57.
120. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
121. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 37 (1803).
122. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).

MCCLOSKEY,

supra

123. E.g., Suzuki v. Japan, 6 Sai-han Minsh-u 783 (1952); see discussion in text accompanying notes 38-44 supra.
124. E.g., Suzuki v. Japan, 6 Sai-han Minshu- 783 (1952); and Tomabechi v. Japan, 7

Sai-han Minshil 305 (1953).
125. STOCKWIN, supra note 2, at 52, 172, 190.
126. STOCKWIN, supra note 2, at 173-77, summarizes the events surrounding the drafting and adoption of the Constitution.
127. The American military government is often referred to as "SCAP," the acronym

for the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, the officer in charge.
128. A. OPPLER, LEGAL REFORM IN OccuPIED JAPAN: A PARTICIPANT LoOKs
(1976).
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ple are equal under the law and there shall be no discrimination in
political, economic or social relations, because of race, creed, sex,
social status or family origin." In reality, Japanese society was and
is strongly hierarchical; traditional sex roles prevail.
As part of the LDP's efforts to revise the Constitution, a Commission on the Constitution was appointed by the Diet in 1957 to
review proposed amendments.
A public opinion poll taken during the Commission's deliberations revealed that though Japanese opposed revising the Constitution to make the public welfare clauses12 more clearly restrictive
of individual rights, they at the same time felt more emphasis
should be placed on public welfare. 130
The Commission on the Constitution, though boycotted by the
progressive parties, chose to make no formal recommendations in
its 1964 report. It noted, nonetheless, that amendments had been
proposed within the Commission to (inter alia) strengthen public
and collective rights against private and individual rights and circumscribe somewhat the powers of judicial review.13 '
Given these public sentiments, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court has interpreted the individual rights provisions of the
Constitution narrowly. Had the Supreme Court aroused the ire of
the public by expounding an extreme individualist interpretation
of the Constitution, the justices would have risked 13disapproval
in
2
the constitutionally mandated decennial plebiscites.
To forestall amendments, and to preserve its own substantial
power under the new constitutional order, the Japanese Supreme
Court might be expected to moderate such objectionable provisions
of the Constitution. The court has in fact interpreted the Constitution to accord more closely with traditional values by means of the
"public welfare" doctrine, thus aiding in the document's
assimilation. 33
129. Article 12 of the Japanese Constitution provides: "The freedoms and rights guaranteed to the people by this Constitution shall be maintained by the constant endeavor of
the people, who shall refrain from any abuse of these freedoms and rights and shall always
be responsible for utilizing them for the public welfare."
Article 13 of the Japanese Constitution provides: "All of the people shall be respected

as individuals. Their right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness shall, to the extent that
it does not interfere with the public welfare, be the supreme consideration in legislation and
in other governmental affairs."
130.
131.
132.
133.

Beer, Public Welfare, supra note 102, at 209.
STOCKWIN, supra note 2, at 190.
Article 79 (2)(3) is set forth at note 40 supra.
In the Tokyo Ordinance decision, supra note 104, for instance, the Court upheld a
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The primary reason that the postwar Constitution has never
been amended is the difficulty of the amendment process. Amendments must be approved by two-thirds of all members of both
houses of the Diet and then approved by a majority of all votes
cast in a national referendum.3 Though heavily outnumbered by
the ruling party, the opposition parties have always been able to
hold enough seats to block amendments. Any suggested amendment has been met with the response that the next step will be
redrafting of Article 9 to permit a return to the dark days of military rule. 135 In fact, legislation has yet to be passed setting up the
basic machinery for a national referendum. It has thus been suggested that while Article 9 has not prevented limited rearmament,
its presence in the Constitution has done much to prevent amendment of any sort. 3 6
C. Social Attitudes Toward Law and Litigation
Japanese have traditionally perceived social reality in terms of
duties rather than rights. When European legal codes were being
translated into Japanese in the late 19th century, the translators
were unable to find an indigenous equivalent to the word "right"
as in "legal right", necessitating invention of the word kenri. 37
Japanese have tended to prefer conciliation to litigation as a
means of resolving disputes; 3 8 they also have hesitated to assert
local ordinance requiring licenses for mass political demonstrations, noting that the people
may not abuse the freedoms of expression, such as freedom of assembly, but have a responsibility at all times to exercise them for the public welfare pursuant to Article 12 of the
Constitution (set forth in note 129 supra).
134. Article 96 of the Japanese Constitution provides:
Amendments to this Constitution shall be initiated by the Diet, through a concurring vote of two-thirds or more of all the members of each house and shall thereupon be submitted to the people for ratification, which shall require the affirmative vote of a majority of all votes cast thereon, at a special referendum or at such
election as the Diet shall specify.
135. STOCKWIN, supra note 2, at 188-89.
136. Id.
137. G. SANSOME, THE WESTERN WORLD AND JAPAN 446 (1949).
138. D. HENDERSON, CONCILIATION AND JAPANESE LAW (1965) [hereinafter cited as HENDERSON, CONCILIATION]; Henderson, Law and PoliticalModernization in Japan [hereinafter

cited as Henderson, Modernization] in POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN MODERN JAPAN 449 (R.
Ward ed. 1968). This apparent preference is a very complex social phenomenon which has
yet to be satisfactorily analyzed. For full exposition of the thesis see Kawashima, Dispute
Resolution in Contemporary Japan, in LAw IN JAPAN 41 (A. von Mehren ed. 1963). For a
vigorous rejection of the concept see Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant,4 JOURNAL
OF JAPANESE STUDIES 359 (1978). See also Beer, Public Welfare, supra note 102, at 211-20.
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individual rights vis-A-vis the government. Japanese have felt that
legal proceedings mean a breakdown in human relations, which
many have felt to be supremely important.1 3 9 Since people are
more "right conscious" in the United States, they are more likely
to take other individuals (or the government) to court. In the
United States, many more lawyers are available to aid these litigants. Discussing the development of the common law in A Social
History of English Law, Alan Harding quotes the maxim: "'the
remedy comes before the right.' But the remedy was provided only
because somebody asked for it. The plaintiff continually injected
shots of real life into the small and complacent world of legal technique. . . . The law is a dialogue between lawyer and plaintiff." 140
Thus, Professor Kawashima Takeyoshi accounts for certain
dysfunctions in the Japanese legal system with the idea that popular legal consciousness has not kept pace with the development of
41
formal legal institutions.
In practice, legal systems respond to social needs. In the words
of Justice Byron R. White of the United States Supreme Court:
"although legal institutions have educative functions and may reinforce certain interests and weaken others, they have only marginal influence in effecting significant and enduring legal and social
change . . . basic change, at least in a country like ours, occurs
1 42
only with changes in the social order.
Thus, it is unrealistic to expect institutions such as the Japanese Supreme Court to make up for lack of "democratic" sentiment amongst the people by showing extra zeal in judicial review.
The Supreme Court can consider only issues raised in actual cases.
D. Characteristics of the Japanese Legal Profession
Several characteristics of the Japanese legal profession have
militated against the development of activist judicial review on the
American model. These characteristics will be considered in the
process of discussing, first, the private bar, and second, the judiciary. The third main group, public procurators (or public prosecu143
tors), will not be considered here.
139. ISHIDA, supra note 21, at 75.
140. A. HARDING, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 220 (1966).
141. Discussed in CHALMERS JOHNSON, CONSPIRACY AT MATSUKAWA 29, 152 (1972).
142. Preface to PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY x-xi (D. Fleming & B. Bailey ed.
1971), quoted in H. EHRMANN, CoMPARATIVE LEGAL CULTURES 148 (1976).
143. TANAKA, supra note 1, in his chapter on the legal profession (chapter 6), discusses
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1) The Private Bar.
As the Supreme Court can consider only matters brought
before it by litigants through lawyers, it seems clear that the fewer
matters that are litigated, the fewer statutes, etc., can be attacked
as violative of constitutional protections. However, lawyers are
needed to litigate, and there are very few lawyers in Japan. In
1973, there were 10,865 people in Japan for each practicing attorney; in a comparable year, in the United States, there were 587
144
people for each practicing attorney.
The number of Japanese wishing to enter the legal profession
is not substantially lower than in the United States,1 45 yet only
about 1% of the Japanese applicants pass their functional
equivalent of the bar examination. The official reason for this low
pass rate is that it would cost the government too much to fund
additional students in the two-year program of legal training
(which, unlike that in America, follows the "bar" exam). The Japanese government pays salaries to successful applicants during their
training at the official Legal Research and Training Institute. It
has been argued, however, that the low pass rate represents instead
a deliberate government policy to impede resort to the legal
146
process.
Further, Japanese attorneys have traditionally possessed much

less social prestige than their American counterparts. The best
known American lawyers, such as Louis D. Brandeis before his ap-

pointment to the Supreme Court, have often been more important
only the three categories enumerated above. Law professors, who do not take the Japanese
version of the bar examination, are not considered members of the legal profession.
144. TANAKA, supra note 1, at 266. These figures may be deceptive in that there are in
Japan several types of vocations, members of which, though not permitted to appear in
court, do handle law-related business. The "quasi-lawyers" include judicial scriveners
(shih'-shoshi), administrative scriveners (gyjsei shoshi), patent agents (benrishi), tax
agents (zeirishi), certified public accountants (k'nin kaikeishi), Japanese notaries (ks-

sh~nin) and law graduates not admitted to the bar. A large part of the legal work of governmental agencies and private companies is handled by persons in this final category, graduates of the law department of a university who have not joined the legal profession. In

addition, judicial scriveners, who draft documents to be filed in court for persons appearing
in pro per, often give legal advice. In the early 1970's registered quasi-lawyers totalled about
65,000-excluding the law graduate category, on which figures are not maintained. Recognized members of the legal profession at about this same point in time totalled about
13,400. The above discussion is based upon TANAKA, supra note 1, at 563-65; Henderson,
supra note 106, at 411-12; HENDERSON, FOREIGN ENTERPRISE IN JAPAN 179-85 (1973).
145. Haley, supra note 138, at 385-86.
146. Id.
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people than the judges before whom they argued. In Tokugawa
Japan (1603-1867), by contrast, the legal profession did not exist.
The closest occupational group was composed of certain innkeepers in the capital city who-though unable to represent clients in
court-customarily ran errands for out-of-town litigants and familiarized them with court procedures. 147 These innkeepers acquired
among modern Japanese a (possibly undeserved) 148 reputation for
swindling, bribery, and usury. 14 9
Given the Japanese people's basic conciliatory orientation towards resolving disputes, practicing attorneys in the period between 1868 and 1945 "were looked upon as intruders, meddling uninvited in disputes which otherwise could have been resolved in
the traditional spirit of 'harmony' ".11o Such popular respect for
lawyers as did exist was accorded judges and public procurators as
members of the official bureaucracy."5"
In addition, in the postwar period, advocates handled cases
poorly at the trial level1 52 and often merely asserted constitutional
violations on appeal, rather than attempting to persuade the trial
53
court of the relevance of the constitutional right.
As will be discussed below,15 the professional competence and
the social standing of attorneys has gradually improved during the
postwar years.
2. The Judiciary.
Several characteristics of the judiciary, the second segment of
the legal profession, militate against vigorous exercise of judicial
review.
a. Small Number of Judges
There are very few judges in Japan compared to the United
States. These Japanese jurists have a great many cases to han147.

HENDERSON, CONCILIATION,

supra note 138, at 59, 135-36, 167-9; Hattori, The Legal

Profession in Japan:Its HistoricalDevelopment and Present State, in LAW IN JAPAN 117
(A. von Mehren ed. 1963).

148.

HENDERSON, CONCILIATION,

supra note 138, at 169.

149. Id.; TANAKA, supra note 1, at 265.
150. TANAKA, supra note 1, at 265.
151. Id.
152. Itoh, Judicial Decision-making in the Japanese Supreme Court, 3
128, 130-31 (1963).
153. Id. at 131; Okudaira, supra note 15, at 93.
154. See text accompanying notes 236-237 infra.
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dle,'1 55 and the consequent lengthy delays discourage resort to
litigation.
b.

Trial Scheduling Which Prolongs Litigation

Japanese courts, following the civil law custom, schedule trials
one day at a time, at monthly intervals (i.e., a matter will be heard
on June 1, then not heard again until July 1). This scheduling
practice means that the average trial takes two years to complete,
thus discouraging lawsuits.156
c.

Civil Law Orientation

Jurists trained before the war were indoctrinated in the civil
law system 157 of jurisprudence, which focuses on interpretation
and application of authoritative legal codes rather than on policyoriented constitutional adjudication,15 as is characteristic of the
American common-law system. These pre-war jurists generally assumed the bench upon graduating from college.15 9 They were then
(and still are) promoted primarily on the basis of seniority,160 in
contrast to American judges, who typically were (and are) politically appointed to high judicial posts after holding important policy-making positions.
It was recognized in 1946 that such bureaucratically recruited
and promoted career judges trained in statutory interpretation
would have some difficulty adapting to the creative needs of judicial review."' So great was the level of concern in Japan in 1946-47
about the capacity of the civil law-trained career judges to handle
judicial review, that special provision was made to limit their
1 62

influence.

155. Haley, supra note 138, at 381-83.

156. Id.
157. Despite recent innovations derived from the common law tradition (e.g., the adversary system), the Japanese system remains fundamentally a member of the civil law family.

Rene David and John E.C. Brierly, in

MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY

(1968),

group national legal systems into four major "families"-Romano-Germanic, socialist, common law, and religious and traditional law.
158. Hattori, supra note 147, at 139.
159. Id. at 121.
160. K. Machii, The Japanese System of Judicial Review: Its Organization and Procedure at 93 (1972) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis in political science, University of California at
Los Angeles).
161. Hattori, supra note 147, at 132.
162. Hattori, supra note 147, at 133-34.
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1. Five of the fifteen Supreme Court justices were not required to be lawyers, so long as they were learned and had some
general knowledge of law.16 3 "The hope was", a Japanese judge
who was appointed Chief Justice in 1978 has noted, "that introduction of nonspecialists would make it possible for the Supreme
Court to render judgments which are not merely logical products
reached from a narrow, technical viewpoint, but are more in accord
with community sentiment."'"
2. Justices of the Supreme Court were to be subject to review
in decennial plebiscites.16 5 Lower court judges were to be appointed for 10 year terms. 166 Pre-war judges, by contrast, had life
tenure.
3. The Legal Training and Research Institute was established to provide continuing education to younger judges and to
163. Court Organization Law, Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 41(1) provides:
Justices of the Supreme Court shall be appointed from among persons of broad
vision and extensive knowledge of law, who are not less than 40 years of age. At
least 10 of them shall be persons who have held one of two of the positions mentioned in item (1) or (2) for not less than 10 years, or one or more of the positions
mentioned in the following items for the total period of 20 years or more:
(1) President of the High Court;
(2) Judges;
(3) Judges of the Summary Court;
(4) Public prosecutors;
(5) Lawyers;
(6) Professors or assistant professors in legal science in universities which shall
be determined elsewhere by law.

Reprinted in

THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN AND CRIMINAL STATUTES,

supra note 1, at 383.

164. Hattori, supra note 147, at 133.
165. Article 79(2) of the Japanese Constitution, supra note 40; Court Organization Law,
Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 39(4) provides: "The appointment of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and of Justices of the Supreme Court shall be reviewed by the people in accordance with laws which provide for popular review."
166. Article 80(1) of the Japanese Constitution provides:
The judges of the inferior courts shall be appointed by the Cabinet from a list of
persons nominated by the Supreme Court. All such judges shall hold office for a
term of ten (10) years with privilege of reappointment, provided that they shall be
retired upon the attainment of the age as fixed by law.
Court Organization Law, Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 40(1)(3) provides:
The Cabinet shall appoint presidents of High Courts, judges, assistant judges, and
judges of Summary Courts from a list of persons nominated by the Supreme
Court.
3. Judges mentioned in paragraph 1, shall, 10 years after their appointment to
office, be regarded as having completed their terms of office and may be
reappointed.

Reprinted in THE

CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN AND CRIMINAL STATUTES,

supra note 1, at 382-83.
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train newly selected judges.""7
In Europe, career judges with such training and experience
have had substantial difficulty adjusting after having had the
power of judicial review thrust upon them. It has been argued that:
the bulk of Europe's judiciary seems psychologically incapable of
the value-oriented, quasi-political functions involved in judicial
review. Continental judges are usually "career judges" who enter
the judiciary at a very early age and are promoted to the higher
court largely on the basis of seniority. Their professional training
develops skill in technical application of statutes rather than in
policy judgments. 6 8
In postwar Italy, reactionary supreme court judges sabotaged
the new constitution, leading eventually to the creation of a special
constitutional court composed primarily of persons of diverse
background, politically appointed, mostly not career judges.1 6 9
It is suggested that Japanese judges who were 1) trained primarily in statutory application, 2) career officials, 3) promoted to
the Supreme Court largely on the basis of seniority, would similarly have some difficulty learning to review legislation, etc., for
constitutionality.
d. Occupation's Failure to Purge Judiciary
Unlike many other important public and private officials in
early postwar Japan, judges were not "purged" in the late 1940's
17 0
by the American military government.
Ushiomi Toshitaka has advanced the following theory concerning how these unpurged judges have affected subsequent legal
developments.""
SCAP sought to strengthen judicial independence by removing
the courts from the control of the Ministry of Justice. However,
whereas much of the old-line leadership of government, business,
etc., was replaced with persons not closely identified with the authoritarian, old regime, the judiciary was spared.1 7 1 "SCAP vested
167. Hattori, supra note 147, at 134.
168. Cappelletti, supra note 34, at 1047.
169. Id. at 1048-50.
170. On the purge, see E. REISCHAUER, JAPAN: THE STORY OF A NATION 225 (1970).
171. This account is drawn from the summary of Ushiomi's theory set forth in JOHNSON, supra note 141, at 416-17.
172. Professor Kurt Steiner, a onetime member of the Legal Section of SCAP, has
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the entire authority for judicial administration, including such
functions as assignment and transfer of judges to specific courts,
appointment and removal of court personnel other than judges,
and financial affairs of courts, with the Supreme Court. ' 17 3 Though
legally unfettered in its ability to select Supreme Court justices,
the Cabinet must appoint lower court judges from a list of persons
nominated by the Supreme Court.7 4 (In practice, this list has included the same number of names as available positions, leaving
75
no choice to the Cabinet.)1
The Supreme Court administers judicial affairs through an
Administrative Secretariat, staffed by career judges who serve
there for several years between assignments on the bench. Ushiomi
argues that the unpurged prewar judges came to control the Administrative Secretariat, so whereas the judiciary was freed from
the control of the Ministry of Justice, it fell under the control of a
new bureaucracy-the Administrative Secretariat of the Supreme
Court. He maintains, "[t]he new agency performs exactly the same
function as the old, namely, keeping judges in line through bureaucratic pressure and in accordance with the dictates of political au76
thorities in Tokyo.'
From a study of the careers of several hundred judges, Ushiomi concluded that judges attached at one time or another to the
secretariat dominate the Japanese judiciary by serving as instructors in the Legal Training and Research Institute, as investigators
who check on the performance of subordinate judges and by occu1
pying positions on key precedent-setting courts.
There are indications that Ushiomi's hypothesis has some validity, i.e., that judges are being kept in line politically. Pacifist
judges have been pressured to resign from certain political groups;
one such judge who declined to resign was dismissed. 7 There is
stated that judges were not purged because they were not seen as important enough. Personal conversation (Mar. 29, 1976).
173. JOHNSON, supra note 141, at 416.
174. Court Organization Law, Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 39(1)(2) provides: "1. The Emperor shall appoint the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court as designated by the Cabinet. 2.
Justices of the Supreme Court shall be appointed by the Cabinet." JAPANESE CONST. art.
80(1); Court Organization Law art. 40(1), supra note 166.
175. Danelski, The PoliticalImpact of the Japanese Supreme Court 49 NOTRE DAME
LAW 955, 962 (1974).
176. JOHNSON, supra note 141, at 421.
177. JOHNSON, supra note 141, at 420-21; see also Okudaira, supra note 15, at 82-83.
178. Subordinate judges, it appears, have been evaluated not only in terms of job performance, but also on the basis of political opinions. During the late 1960's and early 1970's,
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also evidence that Legal Training and Research Institute graduates
have been denied appointment as judges solely because of membership in a pacifist organization.' 7
E. Parliamentary v. Judicial Supremacy
Japan's historical experience with parliamentary government
has raised suspicions as to the usefulness of a system wherein
judges have the last word on the validity of legislation. There is, in
addition, a glaring theoretical inconsistency between the concept of
parliamentary supremacy based on popular sovereignty and the
concept of judicial supremacy via judicial review.18 0
Considered as a whole, the postwar Constitution by no means
supplies a clear mandate for a judicial veto over all government
actions.""' Article 41, after all, denotes the Diet as the "highest organ of state power" and the "sole law-making organ of the state".
Dan F. Henderson, the foremost American student of Japanese
law, aptly characterizes this ambiguity as "dual supremacy" of

court and Diet. 82
It5 Masami, the eminent constitutional law scholar who was
recently appointed to the Supreme Court, has recognized the paradoxical role of judicial review in a democratic system. Though impatient with certain decisions upholding laws limiting freedom of
expression, and with the limited use of judicial review, Ito (writing
in 1961) noted:
a bitter controversy raged over the fact that certain judges were members of the Young
Lawyers Association, a "progressive" group formed to defend the Peace Constitution against
conservative revision efforts. (This discussion is based on ITOH & BEER, supra note 1, at 1617; STOCKWIN, supra note 2, at 187-88; and Okudaira, supra note 15, at 80-82).
The LDP and other conservative groups initially (in 1967-68) campaigned against
judges belonging to the group as pro-Communist, citing lower court decisions involving labor
disputes and political demonstrations as evidencing left-wing bias. In 1969 Judge
Fukushima, a Young Lawyers Association member, enjoined construction of the Nike Missile Base at Naganuma, adding fuel to the fire. The Diet then launched an investigation of
judges thought to be members; the secretary-general of the Supreme Court warned that
judges joining political organizations might give the appearance of ideological bias. Next, ten
younger judges working within the Secretariat resigned from the Association. One other
member judge was subsequently not re-appointed at the end of his ten-year term; another
judge resigned in protest. See text accompanying note 187 infra.
179. Danelski, supra note 175, at 966.
180. STOCKWIN, supra note 2, at 49.
181. OPPLER, supra note 128, at 88, notes that this fact may have made the court reluctant to exercise the power of judicial review.
182. Henderson, Modernization,supra note 138, at 441.
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Of course, the number of decisions holding laws unconstitutional
does not always indicate the efficacy of judicial review. Excessive
use of judicial review might threaten the progress of democracy in
Japan. In this sense, I cannot support the very high value that
some attach to judicial review as a technique of constitutional
government. . . . [I]n a great many situations the political process, not the judicial process, should be relied upon to realize the
rule of law. It is for this reason that, in spite of the critical attitude of many scholars, I supported the decision of the Supreme
Court in the Sunakawa case [refusing to hold unconstitutional
1ss
the stationing of American military forces in Japan] ....
Indeed, to guard against overzealous use of judicial review, the
American Supreme Court has evolved the doctrines that legislation
should be presumed constitutional 8 4 and that the Court should
whenever possible avoid ruling upon a constitutional question if a
case can be disposed of upon narrower grounds. 8 5 Justice Louis D.
Brandeis stressed the point that judges-as appointed not elected
officials-should be scrupulously careful not to substitute their
policy preferences for those of elected representatives.8 6
F. Impediments Inherent in Judicial Organization
1) Supreme Court's Administrative Duties.
In its role as the Judicial Assembly, 1 7 the Japanese Supreme
Court exercises administrative authority over the judiciary. Feeling
that control of the judiciary by the Ministry of Justice endangered
judicial independence, the framers granted to the high court (in
183. Its, The Rule of Law: ConstitutionalDevelopment, in LAW IN JAPAN 238n (A. von
Mebren ed. 1963).
184. J. NOWAK, J. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 85 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as CONSTITUTIONAL LAW]; United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53
n.4 (1938); Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 354-55 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring).
185. See, e.g., Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 568-74 (1947); CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,

supra note 184, at 83-85.

186. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. at 354-55. Similarly Johnson praises the "more powerful" postwar judges for not trying "to advance their own political opinions against those of the popularly elected Diet." JOHNSON, supra note 141, at 421.
187. Court Organization Law, Law 59 of 1947, art. 12 provides:
1. In its conduct of judicial administrative affairs, the Supreme Court shall act
through the deliberations of the Judicial Assembly and under the general supervision of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
2. The Judicial Assembly shall consist of all Justices, and the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court shall be the chairman thereof.
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Article 77) the "rule-making power", under which the Supreme
Court "determines rules of procedure and of practice and of matters relating to attorneys, the internal discipline of the courts, and
the administration of judicial affairs."
Although autonomy from the Ministry was indeed achieved,
an unintended consequence of this grant of power was to foster a
preoccupation with administration, especially personnel management in lower courts. 18 8 Administrative duties not delegated to the
Administrative Secretariat have absorbed time that might otherwise have been spent grappling with constitutional questions.
2) Requirements of the Court Organization Law of 1947.
Three provisions of the hastily-drafted 89 Court Organization
Law of 1947 also impede the effective exercise of judicial review.
a. Brief Tenure on the Bench
Perhaps the most serious shortcoming of the 1947 law is setting strict age criteria for appointment and retirement. Appointees
must be at least forty (Article 41);la0 retirees, no more than seventy
(Article 50).'1' In combination with a firmly established custom of
appointing persons in their early 60's, this requirement has re19 2
sulted in a rapid turnover of court personnel.
Appointees are selected from persons occupying the top rungs
of hierarchical career ladders. 93 It is considered improper to appoint younger men from, for instance, the judiciary because to do
so would be an affront to judges who, though graduates from a uni19 4
versity in the same year, would still be in much lower positions.
188. See, e.g., the controversy detailed in note 178 supra.The decision to not reappoint
the young judge who belonged to the pacifist organization was made by the full court.
189. See OPPLER, supra note 128, at 75-76.
190. See Court Organization Law, Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 41(1), set forth in note 163
supra.
191. Article 50 provides: "Justices of the Supreme Court shall retire upon the attainment of 70 years of age. ..

."

192. Schubert, Judges and PoliticalLeadership in POLITIcAL LEADERSHIP IN INDUSTRIALIZED SOCIETIES 255-56 (Edinger ed. 1967).
193. Men leave the three ladders only when they reach the compulsory retirement
age for the position they then are filling; for presidents of high courts, this is 65;
for procurators, 63 or 65; for Tokyo University Professors, 60; and although there
is no such limit for attorneys in private practice, their average age at appointment
has been 62. Id.
194. See Johnson, The Reemployment of Retired Government Bureaucratsin Japanese Big Business, 14 ASIAN SURVEY 959-60 (1974), for an explanation of this seniority
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When an unusually young justice was in fact appointed in the
1950's, two Supreme Court justices vainly tried on this basis to
persuade the justice minister to withdraw the nomination. 95
The resulting rapid turnover of justices has made it more difficult to gain experience and to develop expertise in constitutional
analysis. 9 6 Clearly, terms of seven or eight years limit the possibilities of professional growth.
Creative, activist solutions to complex legal problems require
considerable exposure to the problems, adequate time for reflection, and sufficient opportunities (i.e., the "right" cases) in which
to enunciate the new legal principles. Consider, for example, Roger
Traynor's pioneering contributions to modern products liability
law. 19 7 Traynor served on the California Supreme Court from 1940
to 1970. In 1944, in a concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co.,19 8 Traynor suggested an innovative approach to defective products cases based upon risk allocation. Eventually, in
1963, this approach was adopted by Traynor's colleagues in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,Inc. 9 " It is noteworthy that Traynor
did not articulate this new approach until he had been on the
court for about four years and that the theory did not become law
in California until another nineteen years had passed.
The leadership role of the Chief Justice can also be crucial in
undertaking innovative approaches to significant legal problems. 0 0
Short terms of service would make it more difficult for the Chief
Justice to develop the ability to influence colleagues. Consider by
contrast the thirty-four year tenure of John Marshall during the
most creative years in the history of the United States Supreme
Court.
Furthermore, the Japanese custom of appointment of the most
senior judges, etc., has guaranteed that the Supreme Court has
system.
195. Danelski, supra note 175, at 963.
196. TANAKA, supra note 1, at 694, makes a similar point.
197. This discussion is based upon G.E. White, The American Judicial Tradition:
Profiles of Leading American Judges, 297-300, 309 (1976).
198. 24 Cal. 2d 453 (1944).
199. 59 Cal. 2d 57 (1963).
200. See F. FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUsR 4-7 (1937). Conversely, Arthur J.

Goldberg, former Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, feels that the leadership role of the Chief Justice is greatly exaggerated; that the only real authority this person has is to assign the writing of opinions; that even this power is limited because each
justice must be assigned his share of opinions to maintain interpersonal harmony. Address
by Arthur J. Goldberg, Hastings College of the Law (Feb. 14, 1979).
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been staffed, at least initially, predominantly by the most conservative members of the legal profession, i.e., those educated
before the war, rather than partially by men of the postwar era.2" 1
When all justices are of the same age and viewpoint there is much
20
less opportunity for fruitful exchange of generational viewpoints. 1
b.

Unwieldly Number of Justices

Article 5 of the Court Organization Law provides for a bench
of 15 justices, a most unwieldly number.20 3 To counter this problem, the Court splits into three "petty benches" to dispose of routine cases. In any case of constitutional significance, however, only
the full fifteen judge court (the "grand bench") may act.
American experience suggests that 15 is simply too many justices. In 1937, in the United States, Chief Justice Charles Evans
Hughes protested against President Roosevelt's proposal to add six
new seats to the nine-man court on the grounds that additional
personnel would make discussion and decisionmaking lengthier
and more difficult.2 °4 In 1954, the Japanese Supreme Court in fact
proposed that its number be reduced from fifteen to a more manageable nine or eleven, but the Diet did not act.2 05
c. Individual Opinions Mandated
Article 11206 of the 1947 law (supplemented by Article 12 of
the Supreme Court Rules) 20 7 seems to require that each justice
201. Schubert, supra note 192, at 256.
202. Id.
203. The pre-war high court (the Daishinin)had 32 members. The framers of the 1946
Constitution reduced the number of justices from 32 to 15, to (1) make judicial offices more

prestigious and (2) to avoid the clumsiness resulting from too large a decision-making body.
OPPLER, supra note 128, at 89.
204. Letter from Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes to the Senate Judiciary Committee, (Mar. 21, 1937) S. Rep. No. 71, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1937) quoted in 2 M. PUSEY,
CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 756 (1951).
Roger Tiaynor, former Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court, has similarly
stated that smaller sized benches facilitate the informal, one-on-one contacts between justices that are so useful in reaching a consensus on solutions to difficult questions. Personal
conversation with Roger Traynor (Sept. 13, 1978).
205. Okudaira, supra note 15, at 77.
206. Court Organization Law, Law No. 59 of 1947, article 11 provides: "The opinion of
every judge shall be expressed in written decisions."
207. Article 12 provides: "Expression of the opinion of each judge on written decisions
shall be made giving reasons therefor explicitly," quoted in I SUPREME COURT RULES 31
(1947).
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write an individual opinion in each decision. This rule is not literally followed in practice, but it is observed often enough to cause
problems. The authors of this provision likely intended to change
the policy followed by the pre-war Supreme Court, which did not
permit dissenting opinions. This objective has been achieved, but
an unintended consequence of this new policy has been to encourage excess verbiage, 08 leading to confusion in many cases as to
the precise rationale of the decision. 09
3) Eight Votes Required to Void Statute.
According to Rule 6, Articles 7 and 11210 of the Supreme Court
Rules promulgated in 1947, although the Court can render decisions when as few as eleven justices are present, the concurrence of
at least eight justices is required to invalidate a statute. Considering the age, state of health and high rate of turnover among justices, this minimum requirement makes it harder to muster the
votes needed to strike down a law.
Two additional organizational characteristics are 1) the lack of
contempt power available to Japanese courts to enforce their decisions, and 2) the limited range of remedies available to plaintiffs.21 '
4) Lack of Contempt Power.
Postwar courts continue to rely on continental notions of judicial power, which restrict available civil remedies to those provided
by statute. If the party against whom judgment has been rendered
refuses to comply, the court must rely on procurators to initiate
criminal proceedings, because there is no judicial power of con208. See generally on this problem, D. MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW § 131
(1973) and E. MCWHINNEY, JUDICIAL REVIEW 235-36 (1965).
209. For instance, in the Sunakawa case, seven "supplementary opinions" (Hosoku
iken) and three "opinions" (Iken) were submitted in addition to the opinion of the court. In

addition, Henderson notes that the first case in which a Diet enactment was held unconstitutional, Sakagami v. Japan, 7 Sai-han Keishu 1562 (1953), may in a sense be regarded "as
Japan's Marbury v. Madison, but its value as a precedent is diminished by the numerous
opinions written by the justices . . . [and] by the decision's consequent overall ambiguity
." Henderson in CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN, supra note 1, at 127.
210. Article 7 provides: "The Grand Bench may conduct hearings and render decisions
when there are present eleven or more judges." Quoted in I SUPREME COURT RULES, supra
note 207, at 29. Article 11 provides: "An accord of opinion among eight or more must be
made if a decision is to be made as to the unconstitutionality of a statute, regulation or
disposition." Quoted in I SUPREME COURT RULES, supra note 207, at 31.
211. This discussion is based on Haley, supra note 138, at 387-89.
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tempt by which the court can enforce decrees on its own motion.
5) Limited Range of Remedies.
The courts accord private citizens a very limited degree of relief in actions against the government. Declaratory relief may be
sought against administrative actions. The courts are also authorized to suspend administrative actions, but the Prime Minister
may veto any such judicial ruling. 12 There is no clear statutory
provision authorizing the courts to order administrative agencies to
take affirmative actions, though some commentators support the
concept.
6) Need to Integrate Extensive Code Revisions.
Another organizational feature of the new postwar legal order
that distracted the Supreme Court from constitutional adjudication was the extensive revision of codes. The Occupation authorities mandated substantial changes in the legal codes that form the
centerpiece of Japanese law.2 3 Interpretation of the new codes has
been a formidable undertaking, to which the civil law-trained justices may well have assigned top priority. Given their training, the
justices likely felt more comfortable in applying statutes than in
making the relatively unguided policy decisions characteristic of
constitutional adjudication.
V.
A.

RECENT INCREASE IN JUDICIAL REVIEW

Stage of Judicial Development

The American Supreme Court is approaching its bi-centennial.
The Japanese Supreme Court was established in 1947. As noted
earlier,2 14 it is inappropriate to judge the Japanese court by American judicial standards. Similarly, due regard must be given to the
relative stages of institutional development.
Though criticized for timidity in the use of judicial review, the
Japanese Court has in fact voided more acts of the national legislature than had the United States Court in an equivalent number of
212. Administrative Case Litigation Law, Law No. 139 of 1962, art. 27.
213. The Civil Code, the Commercial Code, the Penal Code, the Code of Criminal Pro-

cedure, the Code of Civil Procedure. See L. BEER & H. TOMATSU, A GUIDE TO
JAPANESE LAW 25-26 (1978).
214. See text, supra page 90.
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years in its early period.21 5 Between 1790 and 1858 the American
Court invalidated two acts of Congress;2 1 6 between 1947 and 1978
the Japanese Court voided five acts of the Diet.2 17 Though the
early United States Court also declared unconstitutional several
very significant state laws, it clearly showed "remarkable" restraint
vis-a-vis the national legislature. As the Japanese court has gradually acquired experience in exercising judicial review, it has become
more willing to challenge the Diet in significant legal areas.
Several other factors have also led to increased use of the
power of judicial review. It has, for instance, become clear that the
post-war regime is stable. The Article 9 issue, though still very
much alive, has declined in intensity. As these stabilizing changes
have occurred, as the Court has become more comfortable in its
role as constitutional tribunal, the Supreme Court has predictably
become more active in its use of judicial review.
B. Recent Cases
Three recent decisions have overturned statutes.2 18 The 1973
Parricide case 219 involved Penal Code Article 200,220 which man215. Danelski has stated that "the Court is coming to political maturity more quickly
than many expected, even more quickly than did its American counterpart after which it
was modeled." Danelski, supra note 175, at 980.
216. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch 137) (1803); Scott v. Sanford (the Dred
Scott case) 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). See also Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 409
(1792).
217. See notes 7-11 supra. The first two decisions may be interpreted as not involving
acts of the Diet. See note 218 infra.
218. The word "statutes" is intended to include administrative regulations, SCAP directives, etc. The Sakagami case (see notes 47 & 48 and accompanying text supra) can be
considered as involving the constitutionality of the "statutes of the Japanese Diet" (Henderson, CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN, supra note 1, at 129) or merely "SCAP directives" (Haley,
supra note 7, at 188). Similarly, the Nakamura case (see text accompanying notes 49-56
supra) has been viewed as either a) holding a "statute" or "act of the Diet" (Henderson, in
CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN, supra note 1, at 133) unconstitutional or as b) holding the application of a statute unconstitutional (id., at 135-36; Haley, supra note 7, at 188).
Presumably, Haley was not interpreting Sakagami or Nakamura as involving the constitutionality of "statutes" when he stated concerning the 1973 Aizawa case (see text accompanying notes 219-226 infra) that "the court for the first time deemed an enactment of the
Japanese Diet to be unconstitutional." Haley, supra note 87, 6 LAW IN JAPAN 174.
Such fine distinctions seem unnecessary for the purposes of this article.
219. Aizawa v. Japan, 27 Sai-han Keishii 256 (1973). The following discussion is based
on Haley, supra note 87, 6 LAW IN JAPAN 173-74; TANAKA, supra note 1, at 725-29; Danelski,
supra note 175, at 960-61.
220. Article 200 of the Japanese Penal Code provides: "A person who kills one of his or
her own or his or her spouse's lineal ascendants shall be punished with death or imprisonment at forced labor for life."
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dated a much more severe penalty for murder of a close relative
than for ordinary homicide. 2 21 Though a similar statute2 2 2 had been
upheld in 1950,221 the Court struck down Article 200 on the
grounds that the disparity between the penalty for parricide and
the penalty for ordinary homicide exceeded that permissible under
the equality-under-the-law clause224 of the Constitution. 2 5
Both the 1950 and 1973 cases involved a clear contradiction
between traditional morality (i.e., devotion to the family) and universal values (i.e., equal protection under the law). With but one
dissenting vote, the 1950 Court had upheld a similar disparate
penalty provision as "merely a concrete legal provision, based on
2 2 By contrast, in the 1973 case, the
the requirements of morality.""
Court voted 14-to-1 to overturn the Penal Code Article 200 penalty
provision as more severe to an impermissible degree. Six justices
would have gone still further, arguing that any difference in penalty based on familial status relationships violated Article 14 of the
Constitution. The dramatic change in the Court's treatment of
these criminal statutes reflects the gradual transformation of values that has occurred in the postwar era.
The second recent case 227 invalidating a statute involved a
provision of the Pharmaceutical Affairs Law which placed geographical limitations on the establishment of new pharmacies. Specifically, the provision banned new stores from opening within 100
221. Article 199 of the Japanese Penal Code, by contrast, provides: "A person who kills
another shall be punished with death or imprisonment at forced labor for life or for not less
than three years."
222. Article 205 of the Japanese Penal Code provides:
1. A person who inflicts a bodily injury upon another and thereby causes his
death shall be punished with imprisonment at forced labor for a fixed term of not
less than two years.
2. When committed against a lineal ascendant of the offender or his or her
spouse, imprisonment at forced labor for life or for not less than three years shall
be imposed.
223. Japan v. Yamato, 4 Keishii 2037 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Oct. 11, 1950), cited in Haley,
supra note 87, 6 LAW IN JAPAN 174, reprinted in MAKI, supra note 1, at 129; PROMINENT
JUDGMENTS, supra note 7.
224. Article 14 is set forth in the text at p. 117-118 supra.
225. Some commentators have stated that the Parricide case overruled the 1950 Fukuoka "Patricide" decision by striking down Penal Code art. 200. See Danelski, supra note
175, at 960; McNelly, American PoliticalTraditionsand Japan'sPostwar Constitution, 140
WORLD AFF. 64 (1977); STOCKWIN, supra note 2, at 183. The 1950 case, however, involved
art. 205(2) of the Penal Code.
226. MAKI, supra note 1, at 131.
227. K.K. Sumiyoshi v. Governor of Hiroshima Prefecture, 665 Saibansho Jih- 1 (1975).
The following discussion is based on Haley, supra note 7.
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meters of existing pharmacies. The Court held in 1975 that other
licensing and inspection controls adequately protected the public
from an alleged threat of debased drugs, and that any additional
protection which might flow from geographical restrictions on location was not adequate to outweigh the serious limitation of the
constitutional right to pursue an occupation.2 28 This case was nota22
ble in that for the first time: 1) an earlier constitutional decision
was clearly overruled, 2) economic legislation was struck down, and
3) a declaration of unconstitutionality had significant prospective
impact, in that other licensing statutes contained similar location
restrictions.
The third recent case2 " invalidating a statute involved the apportionment plan of the lower house of the Diet. Despite a huge
postwar shift in population from rural to urban areas, the Diet has
reapportioned23 1 its lower house only twice, in 1964 and 1975. In
1972, one urban district had five times as many voters per elected
representative as did a certain rural district with a stable population. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party, generally weakest in
major cities, was apparently in no hurry to increase the opposition
parties' representation in the Diet.
Earlier, in 1964, the Supreme Court had rejected a claim that
the apportionment scheme violated the constitutional guarantee of
equality under the law, holding that the disparity of the political
value of a vote among districts had not yet reached the point
where it could be considered an abuse of legislative discretion.2 3 2 In
Kurokawa v. Chiba Prefecture Election Commission,2 3 3 the Court
took the next step, holding that the apportionment plan in effect
at the time of the December, 1972 general election violated not
only the equality-under-the-law clause, 3 4 but also the constitu228. Article 22(1) of the Japanese Constitution provides: "Every person shall have freedom to choose and change his residence and to choose his occupation to the extent that it
does not interfere with the public welfare."
229. Shimizu v. Japan (the Bathhouse case), 9 Keish-u 89 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Jan. 26, 1955),
cited in Haley, supra note 7, at 191, reprinted in MAKI, supra note 1, at 293.
230. Kurokawa v. Chiba Prefecture Election Commission, 30 Sai-han Minshii 223
(1976). The following discussion is based on Haley, supra note 57, at 151.
231. Technically, the Diet was not "reapportioned" since no redistribution occurred-additional seats were simply added.
232. Ishiyama v. Tokyo Prefecture Election Commission, 18 Sai-han Minshul 270
(1964).
233. 30 Sai-han Minshi 223 (1976).
234. Article 14, set forth in the text pp. 117-118 supra.
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tional guarantees of universal suffrage 5 and nondiscrimination
among candidates. 23 6 This case was not decided until after the intervening 1975 apportionment. The eight-justice majority declined
to invalidate the election absent express constitutional authority
for this action. Five justices would have taken this latter step, arguing that there was no other effective way to remedy the violations of the Constitution.2 3 7
Kurokawa is noteworthy as following a pattern in which the
Court first signals its dissatisfaction with a certain state of legal
affairs to the Diet, and then, in the absence of parliamentary response, takes more decisive action. Though failing to invalidate the
election, Kurokawa represents a significant shift in the Court's
thinking and increases pressure on the Diet to undertake significant electoral reform.
C. Changes in the Legal Profession
The legal profession has undergone several significant changes
in the postwar years, changes which help to explain the increased
use of judicial review.
1) The Private Bar.
Attorneys in private practice have become increasingly effective in litigation. For instance, trial lawyers' skill in examining witnesses has improved. 2 8 Japanese attorneys had little opportunity
to develop this skill under the pre-war system because the judge
did most of the questioning.
Both the social prestige and income of attorneys in private
practice has gradually improved since the war, to the point that
judicial and prosecutorial posts once much coveted by these attorneys are now considered undesirable, almost certainly because of
lower pay and possibly because of lower status. 23 9
235. Article 15 of the Japanese Constitution provides: "The people have the inalienable
right to choose their public officials and to dismiss them. . . . Universal adult suffrage is
guaranteed with regard to the election of public officials."
236. Article 44 of the Japanese Constitution provides: "The qualifications of members
of both Houses and their electors shall be fixed by law. However, there shall be no discrimination because of race, creed, sex, social status, family origin, education, property, or
income."
237. See text accompanying notes 57 & 58 supra; Haley, note 138 supra, at 387-88.

238. E.g., Itoh, supra note 152, at 131.
239. TANAKA, supra note 1, at 552.
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The better Legal Training and Research Institute graduates
are beginning to enter private practice, reversing the earlier trend
of this group to accept public service jobs. There have been demands that the government cease paying salaries to students at the
Institute because increasing numbers of these students are seeking
employment in the private sector.240
The ratio of people to lawyers has improved slightly in the
postwar years, increasing access to the courts. 241 There remain,
nonetheless, comparatively few lawyers in Japan.24 2
2) The Judiciary.
The judiciary, like the private bar, has undergone several significant postwar changes which help to explain the greater willingness to invalidate laws through judicial review.
of3
First, "the slow processes of the generational replacement 24
personnel have brought a gradual transformation in outlook.
Older judges, who trained and served under the Meiji Constitution,
have gradually been replaced by younger men whose values crystallized in the postwar era. The defeat in World War II was a great
watershed in Japanese history. Postwar Japan has been a much
freer,24 4 more democratic society. Although judges as a group are
more conservative in outlook than lawyers in private practice,
younger judges are fairly liberal in comparison to jurists trained
before the war.245 Younger judges favoring a pacifist interpretation
of Article 9 have clashed with older judges. Younger trial court
judges have attempted to strike down both the U.S./Japan Security Treaty 246 and the Japanese SDF 247 as in violation of Article 9.
Another factor that helps to account for increased willingness
to invalidate acts of the Diet is the increased prestige of judicial
office. In the pre-war era, careers in the administration were seen
as more desirable than careers as judges. 248 Before the war very few
240. NODA, supra note 25, at 142.
241. Haley, supra note 138, at 380-86.
242. TANAKA, supra note 1, at 267-68.
243. BLACK, supra note 25, at 340.
244. Contemporary Japan is considered to be much freer than most other Asian nations. See Geck, Individual Freedoms in Today's World; Laws and Reality, 1 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 235, 242-45 (1978).
245. ISHIDA, supra note 21, at 76, 133 n.14.
246. Japan v. Sakata, 13 Sai-han Keishu 3225 (1959).
247. Minister of Agriculture and Forestry v. Its, 821 Hanrei Jih 21 (1976).
248. This discussion is based on Danelski, supra note 20, at 46-49. One of the Meiji
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of the most talented Tokyo graduates became judges; careers as
bureaucrats were seen as more prestigious.24 9 Imperial University
Law Faculty graduates could in fact enter the judiciary without
taking an examination such as that required of candidates for administrative positions. Reflecting in part the increased power and
prestige of judicial service, the number of law faculty graduates
taking the National Legal Examination has increased dramatically
in the postwar years.25 0 Ironically, this improved judicial prestige is
attributable to the fact that judges are now popularly regarded as
full-fledged government officials, rather than as in pre-war Japan,
"step-children of the bureaucracy251
This increased judicial authority is reflected in the manner in
which recent Supreme Court justices have been selected. 252 Some
recent appointees to the Court, although formally selected by the
Prime Minister, appear actually to have been chosen by the Court.
As indicated previously, the Supreme Court has customarily recommended, subject to the Prime Minister's veto, particular individuals to fill vacancies. Nevertheless, on three occasions between
1970 and 1974, individuals backed by the Chief Justice prevailed
over the Prime Minister's choices-a striking example of the
strength of the bureaucratic ethic in the judiciary.
D. Development of Popular Legal Consciousness
It appears that popular legal consciousness (to use again Professor Kawashima's phrase)2 53 has begun to catch up with formal
legal institutions.
American law has grown much more complex and extensive in
the century of modernization following the Civil War. A key factor
contributing to this growth has been the breakdown of the family
reforms in the late 19th century was the establishment of Western-style Imperial universities. The law faculties of these Imperial Universities were designed as training academies for
the official bureaucracy. See text accompanying notes 106-10 supra.
249. Tokyo Imperial University (today Tokyo University) was the most prestigious in-

stitution. Daneiski, supra note 20, at 46-49.
250. Danelski, The Supreme Court of Japan: An Exploratory Study in
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123-24 (G.A. Schubert & D. J. Danelski ed. 1969).
251. This phrase is used in SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS,
REORIENTATION OF JAPAN 200 (1949), quoted in Daneiski, supra note 20, at 47.
252. This discussion is based on Daneiski, supra note 175, at 962-63.
253. See text accompanying note 141 supra.
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and the church as agencies of social control.254 Similarly, diminished political solidarity and growing impersonality have led to a
greater need for law. 55 Japan, as a society undergoing modernization, has been subject to some of the same stresses; law appears to
be similarly becoming more necessary in Japan.
Since the end of World War II, "democratic" values have become more firmly entrenched in Japanese popular consciousness,
owing in large part to the reformed educational system and the
free press. Though transformation of values is a very slow process,
it seems clear that significant change has occurred. Analysts such
as Robert Bellah suggest that the traditional group-centered value
system is still dominant in Japan.256 More recent empirical studies
show that urbanization and associated population mobility have to
an extent undermined traditional communities.257
Industrialization and urbanization have also resulted in significant air, water and noise pollution in many parts of Japan. Persons facing serious pollution levels have sought judicial redress of
grievances, after more informal methods failed. 258 Also, in sharp
contrast to traditional hierarchical approaches to problem-solving,
highly motivated citizens have banded together in grassroots political action groups to attack particular pollution problems in local
9
areas.

25

This trend toward vigorous assertion of rights, whether in
court or in the political arena, represents a significant shift from
the traditional focus on duties to family, to the emperor, etc.
Are Japanese becoming more litigious? 260 This is a difficult
question to answer, especially in light of the division of opinion
among commentators as to whether Japanese were ever less litigious than, e.g., Americans.261 One view is that the Japanese are becoming more litigious, at least in terms of attitudes toward the legal process, if not in terms of actual numbers of cases filed.262
254. J. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW 15 (1950).
255. Id. at 440.
256. BELLAH, Values and Social Change in Modern Japan in BEYOND BELIE, supra
note 22, at 116.
257. G. ALLINSON, JAPANESE URBANISM: INDUSTRY AND POLITICS INKARYA, 1872-1972
(1975).
258. TANAKA, supra note 1, at 417-28, 443.
259. ITOH & BEER, supra note 1, at 14.
260. Litigiousness has been defined as "the propensity to settle disputes through the
judicial process." H. EHRMANN, CoMPARATIvE LEGAL CuLTURES 83 (1976).
261. See note 138 supra.
262. NoDA, supra note 25, at xii.
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Consistent with this view, is John Haley's argument that more disputes would find their way into court but for institutional constraints discouraging resort to litigation-su"ch as delay stemming
from the small number of judges, lack of effective legal remedies,
etc.

26 3

VI. CONCLUSION
Initially cautious in its use of the newly-conferred power of
judicial review, the Japanese Supreme Court has since 1973 been
more willing to invalidate legislation. The Court's initial perception of judicial review was shaped by radical demands that the justices declare the Japanese military to be in violation of Article 9 of
the Constitution, the peace clause. Judicial resistance to such pacifist demands affected other legal areas as well, since the court
tended to shy away from any action that would undermine or embarrass the new government. As the Article 9 issue gradually declined in explosiveness, and as it became clear that the postwar
regime would survive the withdrawal of the American occupying
army, the court became more receptive to demands that laws be
struck down.
Meanwhile, justices and litigating attorneys alike became more
familiar with and skilled in the radically new techniques of constitutional policy-making. Men more open to the new idea of judicial
review and less committed to the traditional values came to exercise influence on the Court. Given the civil law orientation of the
Japanese legal order and the status of the Diet as the "highest organ of state power"
it is likely that the Japanese Supreme Court
will continue to exercise far less power through judicial review than
does its American counterpart.
Nonetheless, the degree of success that the Court has achieved
represents a remarkable break with the past. Testing acts of the
Diet in terms of adherence to universal legal principles is a dramatic departure from the traditional ideal of unqualified loyalty to
the community. The infusion of such universal principles, rather
than weakening the state, as had long been feared, may well contribute to the long-run stability and strength of the Japanese
polity.

263. Haley, supra note 138, at 380-86.
264. JAPANESE CONST. art. 41, set forth in note 118 supra.
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